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ADVANTAGE TENANT:
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
GIVES TENANTS OVERSIZED RACKETS
IN THE EVICTION MATCH
Bennett S. Silverberg*
The effect of this Court's ruling is to require a sea of
change in the practice as well as to open the door to a
flood offederal court suits against lawyers under the [Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act]. ... [Tihese consequences
will have untoward effects.'
INTRODUCTION
Et domus sua cuique tutissimum refugium.2 Just as a man may
be expected to protect his home from foreign invaders or burglars,
any attempt to invade a man's home will meet resistance. This
resistance will ensue even if the invader arrives at the doorstep
with the law on his side. Even the most docile and law-abiding of
tenants will respond in a negative manner when faced with an
eviction notice. The eviction is not viewed from the tenant's
perspective as an attempt by the landlord to recover the use of his
valuable asset but as an invasion of the tenant's castle. Only in
today's more civilized manner of dealing with invaders armed with
the law, does the tenant view the eviction not as a war, but the
beginning of a legal game.
The eviction match begins. The stakes are serious: for the
tenant, the roof over his family's head; for the landlord, a vital
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University,
1997. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Noble Impulse (1991-2000).
1 Romea v. Heiberger, 988 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
2 For a man's house is his castle. Sir Edward Coke (1644), quoted in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 208-09 (Angela Partington ed., rev. 4th
ed. 1996).
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source of income. The players enter the court, but the landlord
starts at a disadvantage. He has been penalized for using an
attorney during the eviction. In response, the court offers the tenant
a larger racquet that slows down the landlord's serve on impact.
The landlord suffers as the tenant unnecessarily prolongs the game
that the tenant knew he would inevitably lose before the match had
even begun.
This situation is the result of a series of state3 and federal4
cases within New York that have seriously altered the manner in
which real estate litigation is practiced by attorneys throughout the
nation. In the past, New York landlords were able to secure a
relatively fast eviction after service of the "three day notice" on the
tenant.5 The tenant had the option either to surrender the property
back to the landlord or cure the default.6 Previously, a landlord
could accept the word of a tenant a few days behind in his rent
payments that he would catch up on those payments. Now,
following the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Romea v. Heiberger, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"')7 gives tenants leverage over the course of the eviction
when an attorney handles the eviction on behalf of a landlord. This
odd result stems from the fact that attorneys are treated as debt
collectors when they attempt to recover the landlord's rent.
The original purpose of the FDCPA was to protect consumers
from deceptive and abusive debt collection practices.8 To that end,
3 See, e.g., Eina Realty v. Calixte, 679 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Civ. Ct. 1998); Dearie
v. Hunter, 676 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Civ. Ct. 1998); SOHO Tribeca Space Corp. v.
Mills, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1998, at 28, col. 6 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.).
4 See, e.g., Romea v. Heiberger, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Hairston v.
Whitehorn & Delman, No. 97-3015, 1998 WL 35112, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,
1998).
' N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999)
(providing for at least three days notice to the delinquent tenant "in writing
requiring ... the payment of the rent, or the possession of the premises").
6 Id.
7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1994). Its purpose is to "eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
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the FDCPA provides consumers who interact with debt collectors
several protections. One of these protections is the 30 day valida-
tion period.9 During this validation period, the tenant, for whatever
reason, can request that the attorney validate the amount of the
debt.' A violation of the FDCPA can stall the entire eviction
proceeding until the federal litigation over the FDCPA violation is
completed. But, tenants need not have evil motives to delay their
evictions, just a desire to remain in their homes.
The effects of the application of the FDCPA to delinquent rent
collection nevertheless will be particularly virulent in New York
City where tenants have now been given a powerful weapon
against landlords in eviction proceedings."l The tenant's recent
victory in controlling the course of the eviction process, however,
may come at a high price, as landlords seek to protect their
investments by raising rents and imposing harsher eviction policies
in reaction to this wave of consumer protectionism. 12
This Note focuses on the invalidation in light of Romea of the
practice in New York under the Real Property Actions and
Procedures Law ("RPAPL") of having the attorney for the landlord
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses." Id.
9 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (1994).
'0 Id. §1692g(b) (providing that "if a consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the thirty-day [validation period]... the debt collector shall cease
collection of the debt ... until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt
... and a copy of such verification... is mailed to the consumer by the debt
collector").
" Romea v. Heiberger, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998). Once under the
protection of the FDCPA, the tenant enjoys the protection of the Act and the
ability to stall the eviction proceedings. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994). The FDCPA
sets forth a debt collection procedure that must be followed or the creditor may
be found liable for damages or lose the ability to collect the debt. Id. Of the
safeguards provided to tenants the most significant are: (1) the thirty-day debt
validation period; (2) a wide range of protections regarding communication about
the debt with third parties; and (3) contacting the debtor when the validity of the
debt is challenged. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (1994). Any litigation outside of the
summary judgment proceeding necessarily raises the cost of the eviction and may
lead to unpredictable results when the underlying debt is challenged.
12 See infra Part II.C, discussing the likely increase in rental costs as a result
of increased consumer protection.
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undertake eviction proceedings under strict statutory guidelines. 13
In Romea, the notice, as required by New York law,14 when
served by an attorney for the landlord, was found to be incompati-
ble with the provisions of the FDCPA.15 Landlords in other states
that have similar summary proceedings soon may also have their
evictions delayed when they have their attorney handle the eviction
notice. 16 Following Romea, the only way a landlord can avoid
13 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999)
(providing for at least three days to the delinquent tenant "in writing requiring
... the payment of the rent, or the possession of the premises").
14 Id.
15 Romea, 163 F.3d at 119.
16 The majority of all states have laws establishing summary proceedings for
rent collection or eviction notice. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9-6 (1991 & Supp.
1998) (allowing landlords to commence action 10 days after notice of non-
payment of rent to tenant); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.220(a)(2) (Michie 1998)
(allowing 10 days notice); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-361(B) (West 1990 &
Supp. 1998) (allowing five days notice); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-101(b)
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1999) (allowing 10 days notice); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1161(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999) (allowing three days notice); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-40-104(l)(d) (West 1999) (allowing three days notice); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-23(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (allowing three days
notice); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5502(a) (1989 & Supp. 1998) (allowing five
days notice); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1996) (allowing three days notice);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.56(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1999) (allowing seven days
notice); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-52(a) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1999) (allowing
seven days notice); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-68(a) (Michie 1993) (allowing
five days notice); IDAHO CODE § 6-303(2) (1998) (allowing three days notice);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-209 (West 1993) (allowing five days notice);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-7-1-5 (West 1976) (allowing 10 days notice); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 562A.27(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (allowing three days notice);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2304 (1994) (allowing three days notice); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 383.660(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (allowing seven days notice);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4701 (West 1998) (allowing five days notice); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6002(1) (West 1998) (allowing seven days notice);
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(b)(3)(i) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (allowing
five days notice); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 186, § 12 (West 1998) (allowing
14 days notice); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.134(2) (West 1989 & Supp.
1999) (allowing seven days notice); 1999 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 199, H.F.
2425, § 504B.321(1)(d) (West) (allowing 14 days notice); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 89-8-13(3)(b) (1999) (allowing 14 days notice upon evidence of repeated
defaults); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.040 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999) (allowing 10
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running afoul of the FDCPA, and enjoy the benefits of an expedit-
ed summary proceeding under state law, is to handle the eviction
himself. This means that the landlord must deliver the three day
notice and handle all aspects of the eviction up to and until the
parties enter court. 7
This Note argues that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
should not have applied the FDCPA to real estate litigation in New
York State. Instead, the court should have ruled that New York's
RPAPL summary non-payment proceeding is not an attempt to
collect in the eyes of the FDCPA. 18 Rather than follow the Second
days notice); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-422(1)(c) (1999) (allowing three days
notice); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1431(2) (Michie 1998) (allowing three days
notice); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.430(1) (1997) (allowing five days notice); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:3(1) (1997) (allowing seven days notice); N.J. STAT
ANN. § 2A:18-53(c)(4) (West 1987 & Supp. 1999) (allowing three days notice);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-33(D) (Michie 1998) (allowing three days notice); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 42-3 (1976) (allowing 10 days notice); N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-06-
02 (1999) (allowing three days notice); Oruo REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.04(A)
(Banks-Baldwin 1998) (allowing three days notice); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41,
§ 131(B) (West 1999) (allowing five days notice); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 105.115(1)(a) (1997) (allowing 10 days notice); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§ 250.501(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (allowing 10 days notice); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-18-35(a) (1995) (allowing five days notice); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-
40-710(B) (Law Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1998) (allowing five days notice); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-16-1(4) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1999) (allowing three days
after termination of relationship between landlord and tenant for nonpayment);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-505(a) (1993) (allowing 14 days notice); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 24.005(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1999) (allowing three days notice);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-16-6(2)(d) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (allowing for five days
notice for nonpayment of rent for mobile home); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-36-3(1)(b)(i) (1996) (allowing for 15 days notice for nonpayment of rent for
normal residence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4467(a) (1998) (allowing for 14 days
notice); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.31 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999) (allowing for
five days notice); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.04.040 (West 1990) (allowing
for 10 days notice); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-6(a) (1997 & Supp. 1999) (allowing
one month notice); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.17(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998)
(allowing for five days notice for year-to-year tenancies); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-
21-1003 (Michie 1999) (allowing for three days notice).
17 See infra Part II.C, discussing the procedures and pitfalls involved in
having the landlord undertake the eviction process himself.
18 An example of such an interpretation is provided in Barstow Road
Owners, Inc. v. Billing, 687 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1998). In this case
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Circuit's reasoning in order to protect tenants in eviction proceed-
ings, this Note suggests other means for New York State to
safeguard tenant interests. Part I provides an understanding of the
FDCPA and New York's summary proceeding used by landlords
to regain their property under the RPAPL. Part II reviews the
Second Circuit's decision in Romea and analyzes the case law
underlying that decision, which interpreted the role of attorneys and
the scope of debts covered under the FDCPA. Additionally, Part II
examines the policy implications on the relationship between
landlords and tenants in light of the Romea decision. Finally, Part
III contends that New York's protections for tenants are at least
equivalent to those of the FDCPA and that the FDCPA does not
need to supplant New York law. This Note concludes that the
Second Circuit's decision in Romea was unwise because it was
based on flawed reasoning in prior decisions and failed to consider
the effect of the ruling on landlord-tenant relations.
I. THE STATUTORY MATCH-UP
A. The FDCPA: Officiating the Relationship Between
Debtor and Creditor
Congress enacted the FDCPA in response to the public outcry
of consumer debtors over the abusive practices of debt collectors
acting on behalf of creditors and to provide additional protections
to consumers faced with inadequate state laws regulating debt
a 10 day notice was sent to business tenants by the landlord's attorney in
accordance with the lease signed between the landlord and tenant. Id. at 848.
Additionally, the tenants were allegedly in default on paying cooperative fees. Id.
at 853. The tenants alleged a violation of FDCPA, claiming that since the 10 day
notice was an attempt to collect a debt, the FDCPA required a 30 day notice of
default. Id. at 849. The district court ruled that the notice as required by New
York's RPAPL is not an attempt to collect a debt covered by the FDCPA but
merely a "jurisdictional precedent to the commencement of a summary
proceeding." Id. at 851. The court treated the RPAPL notice like a "pleading or
other court-related document" and therefore found it not to be within the
coverage of the FDCPA. Id.
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collection practices.' 9 In passing the FDCPA, Congress sought to
reduce the abusive practices which burdened the lives of consum-
ers. 20 Additionally, Congress hoped the FDCPA would lead to
"consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses.",2' The following examines the FDCPA, outlining the
statute's requirements, repercussions of noncompliance, and the
extent of the FDCPA's supremacy over state law.
1. Statutory Requirements of the FDCPA
The FDCPA provides substantive protections to consumers and
sets limits on the activities of debt collectors. However, the
FDCPA only applies to certain types of debt collection transactions.
First, the party initiating any communication must be a debt
collector.22 The Act excludes any party who is attempting to
collect debts owed to themselves 23 or parties that have a special
relationship to the creditor.24 In addition, the actual creditor will
'9 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994). The purpose of the Act has remained unchanged
since its original incarnation in 1977 as an amendment to the Consumer Credit
Protection Act. Id. Its purpose is to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices
by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses." Id. § 1692(e).
20 Id. § 1692(a) (observing that "[a]busive debt collection practices
contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the
loss of jobs, and to invasions of personal privacy").
21 Id. § 1692(e).
22 Id. § 1692a(6) (defining "debt collector" as "any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another").
23 Id. § 1692a(6)(F) (excluding "any person collecting or attempting to
collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent
such activity ... concerns a debt which was originated by such person").
24 Id. § 1692a(6)(A)-(D). Parties who have a special relationship to the
creditor include an officer or employee of the creditor collecting debts for the
creditor and process servers attempting to serve legal process in connection with
the legal enforcement of a debt. Id.
233
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
not be exempted from FDCPA coverage if the creditor "uses any
name other than his own" in attempting to collect the debt since
the use of a third party's name would suggest to the debtor that a
party, other than the original creditor, is involved in the collection
of the debt.2' The term "debt collector" previously exempted
attorneys involved in debt collection, but that exemption was
removed from the Act. 26 After a great outcry from the debtor
constituency over "perceived abuse" by attorneys of their exemp-
tion in their debt collection practices, attorneys lost their exemption
25 Id. § 1692a(6) (stating that "[any creditor who, in the process of
collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate
that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts" will not
receive the exclusion normally given to creditors attempting to collect their own
debts).
26 The FDCPA, as originally enacted, included attorneys in the list of parties
who were not debt collectors. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a (6)(F), repealed by 100 Stat.
768 (1986). This included "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney
on behalf of and in the name of a client." Id. Although attorneys are no longer
exempt from the FDCPA, the legislative history suggests that the Act retains an
exemption for attorneys engaged in litigation. See 132 CONG. REc. H10031-02
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Annunzio) (stating that "[o]nly
collection activities, not legal activities, are covered by the act .... The act
applies to attorneys when they are collecting debts, not when they are performing
tasks of a legal nature."); Paulemon v. Tobin, 30 F.3d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that some courts have determined, through an examination of the
legislative history, that an attorney exemption still exists under the FDCPA). To
suggest that the Act covered attorney litigation activities would "produce absurd
outcomes." Green v. Hocking, 9 F.3d 18, 21 (6th Cir. 1993). This view was
altered significantly after the Supreme Court's decision in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514
U.S. 291 (1995), which apparently brought attorney litigation activities within the
scope of activities covered by the FDCPA. The FDCPA now defines a debt
collector as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or
the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
(1994) (emphasis added).
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status. Attorneys, however, recently won a battle to reclaim
some of their exemption status.28
27 See generally William Strout, Heintz v. Jenkins-Application of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act to Litigators: Not the Death Knoll for Attorneys,
Just an Unsound Decision, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 310, 311 (1995). While
it is unlikely that attorneys will ever regain their "exemption status" through
legislative action, it is still possible for the Supreme Court to reverse its earlier
decision holding that litigation activities are covered under the FDCPA in light
of the case law developed as a result of Heintz. It should be noted that
enforcement of New York's Code of Professional Responsibility might yield the
same results that Congress intended in both litigation and non-litigation contexts.
See generally N.Y. CODE OF PROF. REsP., Preamble (McKinney 1998) ("CPR").
The disciplinary rules serve both as an "inspirational guide [to attorneys] and as
a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls bellow the
required minimum standards" of the rules. CPR, Preliminary Statement. Under
the CPR, an attorney is prohibited from taking any action on behalf of a client
when such action would "serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
Id. at Canon 7 (stating that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law").
The sanctions imposed for a violation of the CPR would be "in proportion
to the gravity of the offense, the turpitude involved, and the extent that the
[attorney's] acts and conduct affect his professional qualifications to practice
law." Id. Any harm the Congress intended to protect against in removing the
attorney exemption, including harassment of debtors and misrepresentation, are
also likely violations of the CPR. The threat of strict enforcement of the CPR,
which could lead to disbarment of an attorney or other sanction, would make the
application of the FDCPA to litigation activities redundant and unnecessary.
Sanctions under the CPR would deter malicious actions by attorneys far more
than a $1000 fine, the statutory maximum under the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(2)(A) (1994). Additionally, affected debtors would not be faced with the
cost of lodging FDCPA litigation against an unethical or dubious attorney. See
also Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1995) (many states base their own
rules for professional conduct on this model code, however New York has
chosen not to adopt the American Bar Association's Model Rules); Mary C.
Daly, An Overview of Ethical Dilemmas, 9 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 113, 116
(1994) (giving a brief history of the CPR).
28 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2305(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (1994 & Supp. 1V 1998)). Under this newly
amended section of the FDCPA, "formal pleadings" are exempted from some
technical rules regarding initial communications from debt collectors regarding
a debt. Id. This amendment recognizes the ambiguities of the statute raised at
oral argument in Romea on appeal to the Second Circuit. Romea v. Heiberger,
163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998). The amendment, however, raises new questions
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The FDCPA governs where the debt collector is attempting to
collect a debt covered by the Act. 29 The FDCPA is only con-
cerned with regulating consumer debts. 3' As such, the debt
collector must be attempting to collect a debt from a consumer. A
"consumer" is defined under the Act as "any natural person
obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." 3' Since a
consumer must be a "natural person," the Act does not apply to
debts of corporations or other non-corporeal entities. Despite this
limited definition of consumer, the courts have applied the term to
persons who may not necessarily be the actual debtor.32 The Act
since the Act does not define the meaning of "formal pleadings," 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e( 11), and it does not completely exempt pleadings from coverage under
the Act. Id. In Romea, the landlord asserted that the statutorily required three day
notice provided to the tenant in Romea should be considered part of the
"prerequisite" pleadings required for a summary non-payment proceeding.
Romea, 163 F.3d at 117.
29 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994). The Act applies to "any obligation or
alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in
which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or
not such obligation has been reduced to judgment." Id.
30 Id. § 1692a(3) (defining "consumer" as "any natural person obligated or
allegedly obligated to pay any debt"). Throughout the FDCPA, the statute speaks
of regulating the relationship and communications between the debt collector and
consumer. See id. §§ 1692b, 1692c. Furthermore, the congressional purpose of
the FDCPA relates to issues such as personal bankruptcies and personal privacy,
issues that are not related to the commercial arena. Id. § 1692(a). For the
purposes of this Note "debtor" will be used interchangeably with "consumer."
31 Id. § 1692a(3).
32 Derek S. Burrell, The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: An
Overview Rx for Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 9 (1996).
Congress' intent, according to the courts, is to protect anyone who "comes in
contact with proscribed debt collection practices" of debt collectors. Flowers v.
Accelerated Bureau of Collections, No. 96 Civ. 4003, 1997 WL 136313, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1997) (quoting Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.
Supp. 174, 175 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)). A consumer under the Act can include the
relatives of deceased debtor if a letter is addressed to a deceased debtor and the
person opening the letter believes the letter was addressed to him. See Dutton v.
Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Del. 1992). Beyond confusion of identity,
courts have held that any person who "stands in the shoes" of the debtor has
standing to sue under the Act as a consumer. Wright v. Finance Serv. of
Norwalk, 22 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir. 1994). A consumer, under this "Stand in the
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defines a "debt" as "any obligation or alleged obligation ... to pay
money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or
not such obligation has been reduced to judgment., 33 In determin-
ing which debts are covered under the Act, the courts have
demonstrated a willingness to be flexible and have broadly
construed the FDCPA's definition of a debt.34
While the FDCPA states what constitutes a debt within the
meaning of the statute, much controversy has focused on whether
an extension of credit is required.35 To answer that question, one
must look at the FDCPA's definition of a "creditor., 36 In general,
the FDCPA's regulations only apply to third party debt collectors
and creditors who use names other than their own to collect on the
debt.37 Therefore, creditors who collect on their own debts are not
covered by the FDCPA since they would fall outside the statute's
definition of "debt collector., 38 The definition of "creditor" under
the statute means "any person who offers or extends credit creating
a debt or to whom a debt is owed., 39 The definition of creditor is
Shoes" doctrine, may be a person working at a corporation as the sole proprietor
or administrator of a trust. Burrell, supra at 21.
3 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994) (defining "debt").
3 See Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems Inc., 119 F.3d 922 (11th Cir.
1997); Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Ltd., 119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir.
1997); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th
Cir. 1997). Other courts disagree with this approach. See Zimmerman v. HBO
Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987) (requiring an extension of credit
or deferral of payments to create a debt).
31 See Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168-69 (requiring an extension of credit or
deferral of payments). But see Bass, 111 F.3d at 1328; Newman, 119 F.3d at
480; Brown, 119 F.3d at 925 (not requiring extension of credit or deferral of
payments).
36 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (1994).
3" Id. § 1692a(6) (including within the definition of "debt collector" a creditor
who while in the process of collecting on its own debts, uses a name other than
its own, "which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to
collect such debts").
38 Id. (stating that "[a] debt collector is one who collects or attempts to
collect debts owed or due another").
'9 Id. §1692a(4) (defining "creditor").
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limited to the initial extender of credit or any subsequent assignors
of the debt.4" Therefore, absent the existence of a creditor who
initially extended credit to the consumer there is no debt to which
the FDCPA could apply.
Finally, once it is clear that a debt collector, consumer and debt
are present, the FDCPA regulates the communications from the
debt collector to the debtor.41 Communications regulated by the
Act include those made to third parties.42 Furthermore, the Act
prescribes when communications may not be made43 and when
further attempts to directly collect the debt from the consumer must
40 Id. The statute does not include within the meaning of creditor "any
person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in
default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another."
Id. This exclusion clearly applies to the "to whom a debt is owed" portion of the
FDCPA's definition of creditor. The "to whom a debt is owed" section of the
definition does not seem to relax the offer or extension of credit requirement of
the definition. It is more likely that the "to whom a debt is owed" section
involves the assignment of a debt created through an offer or extension of credit
to another. Hence, the statute's concern with creditors assigning their debts to
debt collectors. Without this exclusion, the "debt collector" would become the
person to whom the original debt is owed, and thus would no longer be
considered a "debt collector" since it would be collecting its own debts, and not
the debts due another. Thus, a debt collector who receives an assignment of the
debt is not a creditor within the statute. The definition would not exclude any
assignment of the debt to another while the account is not in default.
41 Id. § 1692a(2). A "communication" under the Act "means the conveying
of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any
medium." Id.
42 Id. § 1692b. A debt collector may communicate with third parties for the
purposes of locating the debtor. Id. In these communications, the collector may
not divulge to the third party that the consumer owes a debt. Id. § 1692b(2). If
the debt collector learns the debtor is represented by counsel, the collector may
not communicate with anybody but the debtor's attorney. Id. § 1692b(6).
41 Id. § 1692c(a). The Act prohibits communications, without prior express
consent, at unusual times or places known to be inconvenient to the consumer.
Id. § 1692c(a)(1). A debt collector may not communicate with a consumer if the
collector knows the debtor is represented by counsel unless the counsel fails to
respond to communications made by the debt collector. Id. § 1692c(a)(2). The
debt collector may not communicate the nature of the debt, without the express
permission of the court, to any person other than the "consumer, his attorney, a
consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the
attorney of the debt collector." Id. § 1692c(b).
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cease.' In communicating with the consumer, the debt collector
may not "engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which
is to harass, oppress, or abuse., 45 Additionally, the debt collector
may not use any "false, deceptive, or misleading representation or
means in connection with the collection of any debt., 46 The
statute contains an extensive list of conduct that would violate this
section of the statute.47
4 Id. § 1692c(c). Once the consumer informs the debt collector that he
refuses to pay the debt or expresses his desire that the debt collector cease
further communications with the debtor, the debt collector may not make any
further communications with the debtor except under limited circumstances. Id.
The only communications permitted are those to inform the debtor that the debt
collector's efforts are being terminated, or to inform the debtor that the creditor
or debt collector may invoke or intends to invoke specified remedies "ordinarily
invoked by such debt collector." Id.
" Id. § 1692d. This conduct includes the use of "threat[s] of use of violence,
. . . obscene or profane language, .. . the publication of a list of consumers who
allegedly refuse to pay debts, . . . [or causing] a telephone to ring ... repeatedly
or continuously." Id.
46 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
41 Id. The most critical of the listed conduct violations include:
(2) The false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of
any debt.
(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will
result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure,
garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any
person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor
intends to take such action.
(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is
not intended to be taken.
(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect
or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a
consumer.
(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with
the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the
consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt
collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information
obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in
subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt
collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal
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When the conduct of a debt collector does not fall neatly within
the conduct listed in Section 1692(e) of the FDCPA, courts use the
"least sophisticated consumer" test to determine whether the
collector's conduct unfairly takes advantage of the consumer.48
This test is an objective standard, eliminating the need for proof of
actual deception by the debtor.49 The alternative to the least
sophisticated consumer test is a test based on the perceptions of a
reasonable consumer, which has been rejected by most circuits in
favor of the least sophisticated consumer test.50 The least sophisti-
cated consumer test protects the most gullible as well as the most
shrewd. 5' At the same time, the test insulates debt collectors from
pleading made in connection with a legal action.
(15)The false representation or implication that documents are not legal
process forms or do not require action by the consumer.
Id. It should be noted that any use of false, deceptive or misleading conduct by
a debt collector, even if it is not among the listed conduct, is also prohibited by
the Act. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993).
" See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318 (declaring the "least sophisticated
consumer" test the most widely accepted test for determining a violation of the
FDCPA). It has been adopted in nearly every circuit, including the Second
Circuit. Id. See also Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d
Cir. 1993); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992);
Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991); Jeter v. Credit Bureau,
Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). But see Blackwell v. Professional
Serv. of Georgia, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 535, 538 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (applying a less
restrictive "reasonable consumer" standard).
49 ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION § 5.5.1.4, at 144 (3d ed.
1996). The "least sophisticated consumer" test is more protective than a
"reasonable consumer" test since "least sophisticated" is a lower standard than
"reasonable." Id.
50 See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1177-78 (rejecting the reasonable consumer test
even though reasonable debtor would have taken debt collector's actions as
empty threats).
"' Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. In a similar area of consumer protection, in
evaluating language which tends to deceive, the courts should look "not to the
most sophisticated readers but rather to the least." Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC,
295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961) (evaluating the standard to be used to decide
issues regarding the Federal Trade Commission Act).
ROMEA v. HEIBERGER
"bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations" by some consumers in
reaction to otherwise ordinary debt collection attempts.52
Another requirement of the FDCPA is that in any written initial
communication with the debtor, the debt collector must inform the
debtor of the validation procedure available to debtors. 3 Unless
"within thirty days after receipt of the notice, [the debtor] disputes
the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be
assumed to be valid by the debt collector., 54 A further component
of the validation procedure requires the debt collector to obtain
verification of the debt and mail it to the debtor upon the debtor's
request.55 Furthermore, once the debtor disputes the debt, the debt
collector must stop any attempt to collect the debt until the debt
collector is able to verify the debt.56
Proceeding to collect a debt without following the requirements
of the FDCPA could subject a debt collector to civil liability on
behalf of consumers who are harmed. 57 A debt collector can avoid
52 Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320. Collection notices are not deceptive simply
because information may be conveyed in a subtle versus an explicit manner. Id.
at 1319.
53 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (1994).
51 Id. § 1692g(a)(3). If the initial communication did not give this notice,
then within five days after the initial communication, the debt collector must
send the consumer the appropriate notice. Id. § 1692g(a). The initial communica-
tion must also disclose the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor. Id.
§ 1692g(a)(1)-(2). If the debtor does not dispute the validity of the debt, it does
not amount to an "admission of liability by the consumer." Id. § 1692g(c).
" Id. § 1692g(a)(4). If a judgment was issued against the debtor, a copy of
the judgment would be mailed to the debtor. Id.
56 Id. § 1692g(b).
" Id. § 1692k. Under the Act, an individual debtor is entitled to statutory
damages not to exceed $1,000 and reasonable attorney fees. Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(A).
Under the Act, a class action may also be filed with damages limited to $500,000
or one per cent of the net worth of the debt collector. Id. §1692k(a)(2)(B).
Plaintiffs in a successful class action will also be awarded the costs of the action
along with reasonable attorney fees. Id. § 1692k(a)(3). The debtor is also entitled
to compensation for any actual damages sustained as a result of violation of the
Act, including mental distress and other provable injuries. Id. § 1692k(a)(1).
Factors considered in awarding damages to the debtor include the intent,
"frequency and persistence of noncompliance" by the debt collector. Id.
§1692k(b)(1). In the event that a debtor brought the FDCPA action in "bad faith
and for the purpose of harassment," the court may award the defendant-debt
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liability under the Act if it can show the violation was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error.58 In most cases,
except for the most egregious of acts by a debt collector, the court
will award the debtor nominal statutory damages59 and reasonable
attorney fees.6° Under some circumstances, this award is enough
to offset the actual debt.6' This provision gives the debtor a great
deal of protection. On the other hand, it gives the tenant the ability
to delay or stall collection of a legitimate debt, such as rent where
the tenant recognizes that he owes the money but launches a
federal FDCPA lawsuit because of a mere procedural violation in
the collection procedure.
2. Supremacy of FDCPA as Federal Law
While federal preemption of state statutes is intended, the
FDCPA does not supplant all existing state debt collection
statutes.6 2 To accomplish nationwide debt collection regulation,
collector reasonable attorney fees in relation to the work expended and costs. Id.
§ 1692k(a)(3). This provision only helps the debt collector when the consumer
has filed a lawsuit. Id. It does not compensate the debt collector for the time or
expense of verifying debts which the debtor knows are valid. Id. It also does not
compensate the creditor for the delay in receiving his money. Id.
58 Id. § 1692k(c). Lack of intent in the debt collector's violation of the
FDCPA may be a critical factor in determining the debt collector's liability for
the violation. Id. The FDCPA states that a "debt collector may not be held liable
... if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation
was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." Id.
(emphasis added).
59 Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (setting the maximum recovery for an individual
plaintiff at $1,000, but the actual amount of recovery will be determined by the
list of factors set forth in FDCPA § 1692k(b)(1)).
60 Id. § 1692k(a)(3) (allowing for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees
and other costs of the action).
61 Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (stating "in the case of any action by an individual,
such [individual is entitled to] . . . damages as the court may allow, but not
exceeding $1,000").
62 HOBBS, supra note 49, § 6.13.1, at 274. The FDCPA purports to set
federal minimum standards for debt collectors. HOBBS, supra note 49, § 6.13.1,
at 274. For example, a state statute would not be inconsistent with the FDCPA
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the FDCPA provides for the preemption of inconsistent state
law. 63 A state's statute is inconsistent with the FDCPA when the
latter's purposes and protections are not incorporated in the
questioned state statute.64 The use of intentionally vague terms
and standards, such as "inconsistency" and providing "greater
protection," gives the courts broad discretion in evaluating
borderline cases.65 In particular, these terms allow a state to create
a system where multiple statutes combine and interact to give
consumers overall, comparable protections and remedies to the
FDCPA. For example, in New York State, the interaction of the
RPAPL, the General Business Law ("GBL"), 66 Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility ("CPR") 67 for attorneys and other local
legislation 68 interact in such a way as to provide consumers with
if it provided more protection to consumers. HOBBS, supra note 49, § 6.13.1, at
274.
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (1994). Under the terms of the statute, the FDCPA
does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the
provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any
State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that
those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and
then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this
section, a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the
protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection
provided by this subchapter.
Id.
4 See id. § 1692(e). The primary purpose of the FDCPA is to "eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. .. and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." Id. (emphasis
added).
65 Id. § 1692n.
66 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349 to 350-f (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999)
(offering New York State consumers protection against the "[dieceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing
of any service").
67 N.Y. CODE OF PROF. RESP. (McKinney 1998).
68 For example, New York City provides consumers with the additional
protections of the City's Administrative Code sections that govern unfair trade
practices. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §§ 20-700 to 20-
706 (Lenz & Riecker 1999).
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comparable protections to the FDCPA during the summary eviction
process.
B. Local Rules of the Game: New York's Landlord-Tenant
Law
In New York, the method of regaining wrongfully retained real
property is governed by article 7 of the RPAPL.69 Section 711 of
the RPAPL explains that the remedy for regaining wrongfully
retained property is a "summary proceeding" 7° or more specifical-
69 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 701-783 (McKinney 1979 & Supp.
1999).
70 Id. § 701(1). Summary proceedings are the most popular method used by
landlords where a tenant is in default. TERRI J. CLELAND, LAW DISTRESSED
REAL EST. § 29.04 (1998). The use of a summary proceeding, as in Romea, is
just one of the ways landlords may repossess their property. Id. Every state has
a summary proceeding for the purposes of evicting a tenant. Id. The requirements
imposed by a summary proceeding statute on the landlord-plaintiff will vary
based upon the various pressures of a jurisdiction, including a heavy or light
caseload and the requirements of the judges and clerks in the jurisdiction. Id. §
29.06. Additionally, in other jurisdictions, the landlord may be able to pursue the
common law action of ejectment or the remedy of self-help. Id. § 29.04. Since
the common law action of ejectment has been characterized as long and
expensive, it is more often used, not as an alternative to, but subsequent to an
attempted use of the summary proceeding, where the landlord is unable to or has
failed to comply with the summary eviction statute. Id. § 29.05. The ejectment
action requires proof as to the right of possession and an ouster by the defendant.
Id. Ouster is defined as a "wrongful dispossession or exclusion from real
property of a party who is entitled to possession" of the property in question. Id.
See also Zenila Realty Corp. v. Masterandrea, 472 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982 (Civ. Ct.
1984) (describing ejectment procedure as "an expensive and dilatory proceeding
which in many instances amount[s] to a denial of justice") (quoting Reich v.
Cochran, 201 N.Y. 450, 453 (1911)). Self-help, a common law remedy that can
be traced back to England before 1831, allowed the landlord to use any "force
short of injury or death" to remove the tenant from the landlord's premises.
CLELAND, supra, § 29.05. Recognizing the use of force can often be
inappropriate in many circumstances and the courts have limited the use of the
remedy to peaceful entries. CLELAND, supra, § 29.05. The use of the self-help
method to reentry is fraught with danger where there is a dispute over right of
possession, since the tenant may bring a wrongful eviction or dispossession
action against the landlord. CLELAND, supra, § 29.05. Clearly, when practical,
a landlord will pursue the easier and speedier remedy of a summary proceeding
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ly, an "article 7 nonpayment summary proceeding., 71 As the name
of the proceeding implies, it provides for a quick, legal resolution
when the action is uncontested.72 In contested nonpayment
summary proceeding actions, the landlord must strictly adhere to
the statutory framework of the RPAPL or the action will be swiftly
dismissed. 73 To further speed the action along, the conditions
under which continuances are granted are severely restricted and
discouraged.74 As with all court proceedings, a defense to the
summary proceeding is that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
case.
In New York, jurisdiction over the nonpayment summary
proceeding is predicated upon a prior communication with the
over any of the other common law remedies. CLELAND, supra, § 29.04.
7' 2 HON. ROBERT F. DOLAN, N.Y. REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE: RASCH'S
LANDLORD AND TENANT 32:1 (1998). A "nonpayment summary proceeding"
is a particular kind of summary proceeding brought to recover possession of
property on the grounds that the party sought to be removed is a tenant, the
tenant is in possession of the property, the tenant is in default in the payment of
rent pursuant to some agreement made between the parties, and a demand for the
rent or repossession of the property has been made. Id.
72 CLELAND, supra note 70, § 29.06. Uncontested actions lead to the quickest
resolutions of nonpayment summary proceedings since the defendant has a short
period of time before the plaintiff can request the court to enter a default
judgment in his favor. CLELAND, supra note 70, § 29.06. Should the tenant fail
to respond to the complaint within a limited period of time, the plaintiff can
request the court to enter a default and subsequently an entry of default judgment
in his favor. CLELAND, supra note 70, § 29.06.
73 CLELAND, supra note 70, § 29.06. For example, if the trial date is
requested before one of the defendants has answered, the trial date will be
vacated. CLELAND, supra note 70, § 29.06.
74 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §745(1) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999).
In New York, an adjournment for 10 days or fewer is permitted "at the request
of either party and upon proof ... that an adjournment is necessary to enable the
applicant to procure his necessary witnesses" or with the consent of all parties.
Id. For summary proceedings conducted in New York City there are additional
statutory provisions with which the parties must comply. Id. § 745(2). In
particular, after the second adjournment by the tenant or 30 days after the first
appearance by the landlord, the landlord may request the tenant to deposit with
the court five days worth of rent and any additional rent as it comes due. Id.
§ 745(2)(a).
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tenant.75 The landlord must either demand the rental arrears from
the tenant, or alternatively, serve a written demand that the tenant,
within three days of service of the notice, either pay the rent or
surrender possession of the premises.76 The notice, provided for
under section 711(2) of the RPAPL, must be "clear, unequivocal
and unambiguous. 77 The purpose of the notice is to allow the
7' DOLAN, supra note 71, 32:13.
76 N.Y. REAL PRoP. ACTS. LAW §711(2) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999)
(stating that a special proceeding may be maintained if "[t]he tenant has
defaulted in the payment of rent, pursuant to the agreement under which the
premises are held, and a demand of the rent has been made, or at least three
days' notice in writing requiring, in the alternative, the payment of the rent, or
the possession of the premises").
The notice in Romea, after informing the tenant of the amounts and months past
due for rent, stated:
You are required to pay within three days from the day of service of
this notice, or to give up possession of the premises to the landlord. If
you fail to pay or to give up the premises, the landlord will commence
summary proceedings against you to recover possession of the
premises.
Respondent's Appendix at A8-1, Romea v. Heiberger, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
1998) (No. 98-7259). If the "demand of the rent" has not been made, the written
notice must be served upon the tenant. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2).
Personal service upon the tenant is required. Id. § 735(1). This requirement of
personal service may not be waived by the tenant through a provision of the
lease or otherwise. Main Street Mall Corp. v. NR Store, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 117,
119 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1992) (holding that a party may not, by agreement,
vitiate the express statutory requirements of RPAPL section 735).
" 95 River Co. v. Burnett, 608 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (Civ. Ct. 1993); N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (requiring delivery of written notice without
specifying the actual text beyond requiring a demand for the payment of the rent
or the possession of the premises on three days notice). The necessity for the
clarity of the notice is justified by the need for a tenant to make an "informed
and intelligent decision." 95 River Co.,608 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The tenant has the
option to either comply with the notice or not, and therefore needs to understand
the text of the message. Id. For example, in 95 River Co., the issue was over the
use of the word "service" in the notice. Id. The notice delivered to the tenant
required the tenant to pay the overdue rent "on or before the expiration of three
days from the day of the service of [the] [n]otice." Id. Since "service" is a legal
conclusion, it may be impossible for a layperson to determine when service was
conducted. Id. Incidentally, a model notice uses the word "service" to determine
the beginning of the three day period. N.Y. REAL PROP. PRACTICE FORMS
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tenant to avoid forfeiture of his property interest by informing him
of the "good faith" amount of rent due.78 If the tenant chooses to
pay the landlord the requested rent within the stated period of time,
the default on the debt will be remedied and litigation will be
avoided.79 If the rent is not repaid, or if the leased property is not
surrendered, the landlord then may commence the summary
proceeding by having the petition issued and served upon the
tenant.8 °
A landlord seeking the return of his premises may not forego
the demand for rent and simply demand possession of the premis-
es.81 The written notice must give the tenant both options: either
pay the rent or vacate the premises.8" Furthermore, a tenant may
§ 10:13 (McKinney 1986) ("you are required to pay on or before the expiration
of three days from the date of service of this notice"). Another factor that must
be clear and unambiguous is the sender of the notice. See Siegel v. Kentucky
Fried Chicken of Long Island, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 390, 391 (N.Y. 1986) (holding
that a three day notice signed by an attorney who the tenant has never dealt with
in the past was insufficient to give the tenant notice); Anastasia Realty Co. v.
Lai, 662 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715 (Civ. Ct. 1997) (declaring that it must be clear who
authored the notice and that the party signing the notice is authorized by the
landlord to deliver the notice).
" Zenila Realty Corp. v. Masterandrea, 472 N.Y.S.2d 980, 987 (Civ. Ct.
1984). The "good faith" amount of rent due included in the notice is supposed
to bear "a reasonable relationship to [the amount] claimed in the subsequent
lawsuit." Id. Prompt payment of the "good faith" amount of rent due should
remedy the default and avoid the summary proceeding, provided that payment
is indeed prompt. Id. If the payment is not prompt, or the proceeding is not
brought within a short period of time after delivering the notice, then additional
rent will become due and the amount stated in the notice will eventually be
insufficient to cure the default. Id. Hence, the demand notice remains effective
and accurate only for a "reasonable period of time" for both the landlord and the
tenant. Id.
79 Id.
80 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 731(1) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999)
(stating the "special proceeding prescribed by [article 7 of the RPAPL] shall be
commenced by petition and a notice of petition"). The actual notice of petition
can only be issued by an attorney, judge or the clerk of the court. Id. It may not
be issued by the landlord. Id.
8" See DOLAN, supra note 71, 32:22.
82 See DOLAN, supra note 71, 32:22. The sufficiency of the notice may be
challenged if the landlord merely declares an end to the landlord-tenant
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not waive his right to receive the "three day" notice. When the
notice is required, failure to properly deliver the notice to the
tenant can be fatal to the summary proceeding.84 Where there is
any doubt as to whether the tenant received the notice, the landlord
has the burden of proving that adequate notice was given to the
tenant." Therefore, in order for the landlord to regain possession
of his property through the summary nonpayment proceeding, he
must demand the rent either personally or through the written
notice.
The courts have not been presented with many opportunities to
test the limits of the preemption clause.86 In New York State, the
relationship and seeks removal of the tenant from the premises. DOLAN, supra
note 71, 32:22. See also, DiBello v. Penflex, Inc., 630 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849
(Rensselaer County Ct. 1995) (holding that a landlord may not solely demand
rent under RPAPL section 711(2) but must offer the tenant the alternative of
surrendering the premises); McMahon v. Howe, 82 N.Y.S. 984, 985 (Saratoga
County Ct. 1903) (stating a notice not offering a tenant opportunity to cure rental
default and only seeks dispossession of property does not conform to the statute).
83 See Alexander Muss & Sons v. Rozany, 655 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (Sup. Ct.
1996) (finding that any express intention of the parties to modify the require-
ments of the statute will not be given any effect); Pak Realty Assocs. v.
RE/MAX Universal, Inc., 599 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401 (Civ. Ct. 1993) (stating that
"[the parties] can not lessen a right given them by statute when it is against
public policy to waive that right.. .. This Court finds that public policy requires
a demand be made.").
84 See Zenila Realty Corp. v. Masterandrea, 472 N.Y.S.2d 980, 984 (Civ. Ct.
1984). Since the statutory framework of the summary proceeding overrides the
common law rights of tenants, strict adherence to the provision is necessary. Id.
See also Salvatore v. Miller & Miller Consulting Actuaries, Inc., 634 N.Y.S.2d
490, 491 (App. Div. 1995) (finding failure to meet the "predicate requirements"
of the summary proceeding, which requires sending the notice, a material
noncompliance of the statute that requires dismissal of the proceeding).
85 See DOLAN, supra note 71, 32:15. If service is disputed at trial, proper
service must be proven by evidence at trial. DOLAN, supra note 71, 32:15.
86 See Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2d 202, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding state law malicious prosecution claims against attorneys not preempted
by the FDCPA); Codar v. Arizona, No. 94-16902, 1996 WL 471335, at *5 (9th
Cir. Aug. 19, 1996) (finding an Arizona law that prohibited out-of-state debt
collectors from contacting its residents preempted by the FDCPA § 1692g notice
requirement); Zartman v. Shapiro, 811 P.2d 409, 413 (Colo. 1990) (holding
Colorado venue provision allowing an action to be brought in any county in
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question is whether consumers have adequate protection from the
various statutory consumer protection laws including the RPAPL
summary proceeding scheme in order to be consistent with the
requirements of the FDCPA. One court has already complemented
the system in stating that the "quick resolution of disputes under
the RPAPL framework satisfies the essence of the FDCPA's
protection of debtors. 87 Considering the RPAPL's consumer
protections, there should be little need for the FDCPA to preempt
the RPAPL statutory mechanism that serves a vital function for the
relationship between landlords and tenants.
88
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In Romea v. Heiberger, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that New York's RPAPL provision, which provided for a three
day notice as a condition precedent for summary nonpayment
proceedings violated the FDCPA when such notice was delivered
and executed by the landlord's attorney.90 The court ruled that the
FDCPA governed rent collection practices by attorneys on behalf
of landlords.9' In so ruling, the court held that rent was a debt
92
and that an attorney collecting delinquent rent payments was a debt
collector.93 The court's decision was based in large part on prior
decisions that led it to believe that Congress intended the FDCPA
violation of the FDCPA venue provision and therefore preempted).
" Travieso v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C., No. 94 Civ. 5756,
1995 WL 704778, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1995).
88 But see Hairston v. Whitehorn & Delman, No. 97 Civ. 3015, 1998 WL
35112, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1998) (invalidating New York's RPAPL section
711(2) to the extent that notice requirement violates the least-sophisticated
consumer standard and 30 day validation requirement). See generally Eina Realty
v. Calixte, 679 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Civ. Ct. 1998) (relying on Hairston to make
similar conclusions).
89 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998), affg, 988 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1998),
aff'g, 988 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
90 Romea, 163 F.3d at 118.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 116.
13 Id. at 116-18.
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to apply to rent collection activities conducted by attorneys. 94
These prior decisions, however, failed to fully consider the
administrative commentary and legislative history of the FDCPA
with regard to whether rent is a debt and whether attorneys were
intended to be regulated as debt collectors under the FDCPA.
Under closer examination of the legislative history, administrative
agency hearings and the statute itself, the Second Circuit was
incorrect in finding that the FDCPA was intended to govern rent
collection practices by attorneys.
A. The Romea Decision
The facts of Romea provide a textbook example of a law firm
following the requirements of summary nonpayment proceedings
under section 711 of the RPAPL from start to finish.95 The law
firm, Heiberger & Associates, with a landlord-tenant practice in
New York City, signed and sent a three day notice on behalf of the
landlord to the tenant.96 The firm did not attempt any other
9 Id. at 115 (interpreting several cases that applied the plain meaning
approach to statutory interpretation in determining whether dishonored checks
were debts under the FDCPA). The court compared back rent to a dishonored
check and concluded that dishonored checks share the same characteristics as
back rent. Id. The court then drew upon the holdings of these courts which
determined the dishonored checks were debts under the FDCPA and concluded
that back rent was a debt under the FDCPA. Id. See also Snow v. Jesse L.
Riddle, P.C., 143 F.3d 1350, 1353 (10th Cir. 1998); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d
1120, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1998); Charles v. Lundren & Assocs., 119 F.3d 739 (9th
Cir. 1997); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Bewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322,
1326 (7th Cir. 1997).
95 Since the Second Circuit opinion in Romea does not relate the facts of the
case in great detail, for the purposes of this Note, many of the facts will be
derived from the district court opinion.
96 Romea v. Heiberger, 988 F. Supp. 712, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The notice
read:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that you are hereby required to pay to 442
3rd Ave. Realty LLC landlord of the above described premises, the
sum of $2,800.00 for rent of the premises: 700.00/DEC96, 700.00/-
NOV96, 700.00/OCT96, 700.00/SEP96. You are required to pay within
three days of service of this notice, or to give up possession of the
premises to the landlord. If you fail to pay or to give up the premises,
250
ROMEA v. HEIBERGER
written or oral communications with the tenant. 9 The tenant did
not surrender the premises or pay the back rent within three days
after service of the notice.9" Following the three day period, the
law firm began summary proceedings against the tenant.99 Soon
thereafter, the tenant challenged the sufficiency of the RPAPL
section 711 notice.'0° The housing court judge ruled that the
notice served was compliant with the requirements of the
RPAPL.'l 1
At the district court level the issue was whether the RPAPL
proceedings were inconsistent with the FDCPA. The law firm
contended that the notice sent to the tenant did not need to comply
with the FDCPA since they were not attempting to collect a
debt. 10 2 Rather, they asserted, the notice was sent as a "statutory
condition precedent" to beginning summary proceedings and,
therefore, was not covered by the FDCPA.10 3 Judge Kaplan, in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss ruled upon the two critical
issues determining whether notice needed to comply with FDCPA
guidelines. First, the court considered the unpaid rent of the
plaintiff a "debt" under the FDCPA,' °4 and second, the notice
sent to the plaintiff to be a "communication" to collect a debt
under the FDCPA.'1 5 At the same time the district court declared
the section 711 notice a communication covered by the Act, the
court recognized a likely appeal of its decision.' 6 The court
stated that the decision would have a "significant effect" on the
the landlord will commence summary proceedings against you to
recover possession of the premises.
Id.
" Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4,
Romea v. Heiberger, 988 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 94-4681).
98 Id.
99 Id.
too Id. at 4-5.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
1"4 Romea v. Heiberger, 988 F. Supp. 712, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
105 Id. at 715.
'06 Id. The court recognized the possibility of appeal, stating that it was "not
without some discomfort that the Court reaches this conclusion." Id.
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landlord-tenant statutory scheme designed for the "fair and efficient
resolution" of disputes. 10 7 Furthermore, the court stated that
"[t]here is nothing to indicate that [this effect] was the intent of
Congress in enacting the FDCPA [which was designed] to protect
debtors from fraudulent and abusive debt collection practices."'
0 8
Nevertheless, the court felt constrained by the statutory definition
of "communication" under the Act.10 9
Fulfilling the district court's prediction of an appeal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to reverse and
determine that rent was not a debt under the FDCPA. Instead, the
Second Circuit handed down a decision affirming the district
court's holding that invalidated the RPAPL provision governing
delinquent rent collection by attorneys on behalf of landlords."0
The first issue that the court considered was whether rent is a
debt under the FDCPA."' For support, the defendant relied on
Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, Inc.," 2 which held that an
extension of credit is necessary for an obligation to be a debt under
the FDCPA." 3 Since rent is paid in advance, the defendant
argued, there was no deferral of payment or extension of credit
involved in this case." 4 The court refused to follow Zimmerman
and instead relied on the "plain language" of the FDCPA.1
5
Based upon the FDCPA's definition of a debt, 116 the court
107 id.
108 Romea, 988 F.Supp. at 715.
109 Id.
"0 Romea v. Heiberger, 163 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1998).
... Id. at 114-16.
112 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987). In Zimmerman the court held that to be a
debt under the FDCPA the debt must have been created by a transaction "in
which a consumer is offered or extended the right to acquire 'money, property,
insurance, or services' which are 'primarily for household purposes' and to defer
payment." Id. at 1168-69.
113 Romea, 163 F.3d at 114-15.
114 Id. The landlord argued that since rent was paid in advance, the
transaction between landlord and tenant involved no deferral of payment or
extension of credit, and that the rent arrearage that was the subject of the notice
in this case, therefore, did not involve debt collection. Id.
115 Id. at 115.
116 The FDCPA defines a debt as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a
consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
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concluded that the FDCPA considered an obligation a debt without
regard to the extension of credit or deferral of payment.'
Once the court decided that rent was a debt under the FDCPA,
it proceeded to determine whether the RPAPL section 711 notice
was a communication within the meaning of the statute." 8 The
defendant argued that the section 711 notice was not a communica-
tion to collect on a debt, referring to the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") Commentary on the FDCPA," 9 which specifically
excluded notices required as a prerequisite for enforcing obligations
through judicial process.12 0 Instead of considering the exception
carved out by the FTC Commentary, the court concluded that the
notice fell squarely within the definition of a communication under
the FDCPA in that it conveyed information regarding a debt.' 2'
Finally, after concluding that rent was a debt and that the
RPAPL notice was a communication under the FDCPA, the court
determined that lawyers sending the section 711 notice under the
RPAPL were collecting a debt within the meaning of the
FDCPA.1 22 The Romea court was bound to make this final
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such
obligation has been reduced to judgment." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994).
..7 Romea, 163 F.3d at 115. The court responded to the landlords argument
by stating that the landlord's argument "misconstrues the issue" by focusing on
whether or not rent is an extension of credit. Id. The court correctly stated that
"[b]ack rent by its nature is an obligation that arises from the tenant's failure to
pay the amounts due under the contractual lease transaction" but went on to state
that the duty to pay back rent "does not derive from an extension of credit but
rather because the [tenant] breached its contract." Id. In so doing, the court
looked at the breach by the tenant as giving rise to the obligation to pay the back
rent rather than the original contractual lease between the landlord and tenant. Id.
It is this lease transaction that should be used to determine whether back rent is
within the scope of the FDCPA.
"8 Romea, 163 F.3d at 116-17.
'19 See infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text (reviewing the FrC
Commentary on the FDCPA).
"20 The Second Circuit focused on this argument in its opinion although it
did not acknowledge the FTC Commentary in its opinion. Romea, 163 F.3d at
116.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 116-17.
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determination in light of Heintz v. Jenkins, 23 a Supreme Court
decision, which held that all attorneys engaging in any form of debt
collection were covered by the FDCPA.
B. The Case Law Underlying Romea
The Romea decision, finding that rent is a debt and that
attorneys are to be regulated as debt collectors under the FDCPA
was largely based on prior decisions that failed to fully consider
the legislative history of and administrative commentary on the
FDCPA. These decisions must be reconsidered in order to reach a
sensible interpretation of the scope of the FDCPA.
1. Attorneys as Debt Collectors: Heintz v. Jenkins 24
Heintz v. Jenkins, a landmark case that changed the role of
attorneys involved in debt collection matters, 25 interpreted the
removal of the attorney exemption from the FDCPA. 126 Although
Heintz attempted to answer the questions vexing many litigators
faced with the removal of the attorney exemption, the facts of the
case do not support the broad declarations made by the Court.
Thus, Romea, a case this Note criticizes for its reasoning, itself
relied on a case based on faulty reasoning.
In Heintz, the defendants, an attorney and partner of the
defendant law firm, filed a lawsuit on behalf of their client, Gainer
Bank, to collect a debt owed by the plaintiff on her automobile
123 See infra Part III, for an in depth treatment of Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S.
291 (1995). The Heintz court was faced with deciding whether attorneys were
debt collectors under the FDCPA. The court in making its decision refused to
consider the FrC Commentary for guidance. Id. at 298.
124 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
125 Strout, supra note 27, at 310 (stating the importance of Heintz v.
Jenkins).
126 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6)(F), repealed by 100 Stat. 768 (1986). The FDCPA,
as originally drafted, excluded from the definition of debt collector "any
attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of
a client." Id.
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installment contract. 127 The Court did not consider whether the
defendant law firm was a debt collector-it assumed this to be
true. 128 After filing the complaint, Heintz sent a letter to Jenkins'
lawyer to memorialize a previous telephone conversation the parties
had in an attempt to "amicably resolve the matter."'' 29 The appel-
late court viewed the letter as an attempt to collect the debt. 30
The court held that since the defendant did not comply with the
requirements of the FDCPA,13 1 it violated the law.
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of attorney debt
litigation by relying on the plain language of the statute. 132
Recognizing that the statute expressed no exemption of any kind
for lawyers, the Court concluded that there was no exemption for
127 Heintz v. Jenkins, No. 93 Civ. 1332, 1993 WL 284115, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
July 27, 1993).
128 For the courts deciding Heintz, it was not necessary to consider this issue
since the appellate courts were reviewing a motion to dismiss and assumed the
facts alleged as true. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 25 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the court was "required to accept this allegation [of being a debt
collector] as true").
129 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (Dec. 15, 1994)
(No. 94 Civ. 367). The relevant language of the letter reads:
[Tihis is a letter to follow up our recent telephone conversa-
tion in an attempt to amicably resolve this matter. I am
enclosing the following documents and advising as follows
.... This matter is next up for status on July 15, 1992, and
hopefully we can discuss it prior to or at the status confer-
ence to reach some type of amicable practical resolution. If
you have any questions or need additional information,
please be in contact with me.
Id. at 4-5.
130 Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 1997). The letter was characterized
by the circuit court as having "nothing lawyerly about it." Id. at 832. Since debt
collection agencies can also send letters in an attempt to settle a lawsuit, the firm
was not engaged in an activity solely within the province of lawyers. Id.
131 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) (1994) (prohibiting a debt collector from attempting
to collect a debt not "authorized by the agreement that created the debt"); see
also id. § 1692e(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting the false representa-
tion of the amount of any debt).
132 Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297 (1995).
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virtually any aspect of litigation.'33 The Court refused to recog-
nize the statements of Representative Annunzio, expressed when
the attorney exemption was removed from the FDCPA. 3 4 The
Representative had stated that the removal of the exemption was
only intended to apply to law firms that acted as debt collectors
outside the scope of the practice of law.'35 The Court claimed
that since the comments were made after Congress voted on the
amendment, they only represent the "views of one informed person
on an issue" thereby restricting the resources available to the Court
to make its decision. 36 This statement, however, is incorrect,
since Representative Annunzio did comment on the amendment
before Congress voted on the bill. 137 The Court also dismissed
the FTC Commentary on the FDCPA citing the Commentary's own
admission that it was not a binding document. 38 Finding that
both Representative Annunzio's and the FTC's Commentary fell
outside the "range of reasonable interpretations of the Act's express
language," the Court held that attorneys are debt collectors under
the FDCPA's plain meaning. 13
9
The Supreme Court's opinion in Heintz in using the plain
meaning, or formalist approach, to interpret the FDCPA was flawed
for failing to consider the legislative history of the statute. Whereas
the formalist approach is efficient in determining a statute's
meaning by considering only the words of the statute, it does not
allow a court to determine a statute's purpose through the review
131 Id. at 298 (finding that any litigation exemption "falls outside the range
of reasonable interpretations of the Act's express language").
114 Id. at 297-98.
131 See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of
debt collection activities the attorney exemption was intended to impact
according to Rep. Annunzio).
136 Heintz, 514 U.S. at 298 (stating that "Congressman Annunzio made his
statement not during the legislative process, but after the statute became law...
[therefore] it simply represents the views of one informed person on an issue").
131 See 131 CONG. REC. H10534-02 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1985) (statement of
Rep. Annunzio).
138 Heintz, 514 U.S. at 298 (quoting the FTC Commentary stating that the
Commentary was "not binding on the Commission or the public").
139 Id.
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of various extrinsic materials. 4 ° In following the formalist
approach, the Heintz Court determined that Congress intended to
eliminate the attorney exemption for all litigating activities
involved with the collection of debt.1 4' The Court summarily
dismissed the defendant's recommendation that it consider extrinsic
materials once it held that Congress' intent could be inferred
through the language of the statute itself.1
42
In Heintz, the defendant contended that if the Act applied to
attorney litigating activities, it would create "harmfully anomalous
results that Congress simply could not have intended."'' 43 The
Court observed that "some awkwardness is understandable" with
the elimination of the attorney exemption, since after elimination
of the exemption, the remainder of the statute remained un-
touched.' 44 Nevertheless, the Court observed that the awkward-
ness was a by-product of the elimination of the exemption and that
reading into this awkwardness to find remnants of an attorney
140 R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW 272, 280
(West 1984).
141 Heintz, 514 U.S. at 297 (considering the plain language of the Act to
evaluate the removal of the exemption).
142 Id. at 298. For further discussion of case law leading up to Heintz, see,
Strout, supra note 27, at 311-15. Strout highlights a split in the circuits on the
issue of whether attorneys involved in litigation are debt collectors under the Act.
See Strout, supra note 27, at 310.
143 Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295. One anomaly identified by the Court focuses on
the provisions of § 1692c of the FDCPA, which governs communications in
connection with debt collection. Id. at 296. A strict reading of the provision
would suggest that any conversations with the debtor, after the debtor indicates
to the attorney to cease communicating with the debtor regarding the debt, would
subject the attorney to liability. Id. This creates a difficulty in filing a lawsuit
against a debtor who has requested no further communication from the attorney.
Id. Another anomaly focuses on § 1692e(5), which forbids a debt collector to
make any "threat to take action that cannot legally be taken." Id. at 295. Under
this provision, any attorney who brought an action against a debtor, and lost,
would be subject to liability. Id. Only after defending oneself through a showing
by a "preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error" would an attorney be able to escape liability. 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (1994).
144 Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295.
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exemption is not justified.145 In defending its reasoning, the Court
stated that other courts can plausibly imply that the Act allows for
communications for purposes of informing the defendant of the
intent to pursue a legal remedy."46 However, in light of the
Court's urging of a literal interpretation of the Act, there appears
little reason for the Court to believe that lower courts following its
example are to read the statute flexibly and imply any exemptions
for attorney communications.
Courts construe the language of statutes in order to give statutes
the effect that the legislature intended.1 47 There are many meth-
ods courts use to interpret a given statute,1 48 each with its own
goals and considerations that will enter into the equation. 149 The
145 Id.
146 Id. at 296 (stating that an "ordinary court-related document does, in fact,
'notify' its recipient that the creditor may 'invoke' a judicial remedy" and,
therefore, comports with FDCPA § 1692c(c)).
147 See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542
(1940). There is no clear cut rule as to how the courts are supposed to complete
their task, but it is clear that to take the words of the statute out of context would
not contribute much to discover the purpose of the statute. Id. In interpreting a
statute, the courts should give the statute a "sensible and practical over-all
construction ... [that is] consistent with and furthers its scheme and purpose."
Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curiale, 615 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (Sup. Ct.
1994).
148 KELSO, supra note 140, at 272. The most often used method of
interpretation is the plain meaning approach. KELSO, supra note 140, at 272. This
method is equivalent to the formalist approach of statutory interpretation. KELSO,
supra note 140, at 272. The other common methods are the natural law approach,
the Holmesian approach, and the instrumentalist approach. KELSO, supra note
140, at 272. The four approaches are on a continuum, with the formalist
approach on one end and the instrumentalist approach on the other. The formalist
approach is the most restrictive form of interpretation. KELSO, supra note 140,
at 272. The instrumentalist approach is the most flexible. KELSO, supra note 140,
at 272. The courts have experimented with the four different approaches since
the founding of the nation. KELSO, supra note 140, at 262. Formalism was
typically the method of choice from 1850 to 1920. KELSO, supra note 140, at
262. Since 1930, courts have typically used the instrumentalist approach in
interpreting statutes. KELSO, supra note 140, at 263.
149 KELSO, supra note 140, at 262. The goal of the natural law approach is
to carry out the purpose of the legislation found in the statute's text and
structure. KELSO, supra note 140, at 262. In discerning the statute's purpose, the
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different methods allow for varying degrees of the "exercise of
individual judgment and perspective" by the judge.15 0 However,
where a statute is the focus of litigation, courts will be less
"freewheeling" in their interpretation. 151
mischief sought to be remedied is considered. KELSO, supra note 140, at 262.
The goal of formalism is to give statutory language its plain meaning. KELSO,
supra note 140, at 262. This method often mandates a literal application of the
statute's text. KELSO, supra note 140, at 262. The Holmesian seeks to determine
the meaning of the statute by putting himself in the role a person involved with
the creation of the statute. KELSO, supra note 140, at 263. He would also
consider the mischief the statute intended to remedy and the legislative history
of the statute. KELSO, supra note 140, at 263. An instrumentalist's goal in
interpreting a statute is to find the legislature's intent in order to carry out its
purpose. KELSO, supra note 140, at 263. All relevant evidence is considered to
determine the intent and purpose of the legislature in passing the statute to arrive
at a fair result. KELSO, supra note 140, at 263.
Adherents to the formalist approach consider little more than the words in
the statute. KELSO, supra note 140, at 272. They will also consider prior judicial
interpretations of the same statute. KELSO, supra note 140, at 273. Followers of
the natural law model will consider everything the formalist will consider in
addition to the title, preamble and declaration of purpose of the statute. KELSO,
supra note 140, at 273. The Holmesian will build on what the natural law
considers in addition to a vast array of legislative materials. KELSO, supra note
140, at 274. These materials would include any Senate and House reports,
statements of the sponsor of the bill, statements of the drafter of the legislation
and other non-legislative and administrative materials. KELSO, supra note 140,
at 274. The instrumentalist considers all the materials the others will consider in
addition to balancing the social polices involved. KELSO, supra note 140, at 274.
He will try to make sense of the legislation in terms of the "developing legal and
social context." KELSO, supra note 140, at 274.
150 KELSO, supra note 140, at 262. There is always the "danger" that the
court's conclusion as to legislative purpose will be influenced by the judge's own
views or factors not considered by the legislative body. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 544. This possibility, however, does not justify an "accep-
tance of a literal interpretation dogma" which keeps the court from reaching a
correct conclusion. Id.
... KELSO, supra note 140, at 263. Due to the restrictive nature of the
formalist approach, there is little risk that the judge's views will be substituted
for those of the legislature that created the statute. KELSO, supra note 140 at 263.
However, an appropriate determination of the legislative intent will require the
judge to use his own "reference" in determining what the legislature originally
meant. KELSO, supra note 140, at 263. Since the emphasis is on what the
legislature intended at the time of the statute's adoption, the judge does not use
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The "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation is just
one of several methods available, but it is the most widely used
when a statute's text is clear and interpretation will not lead to an
absurd result. 52 This was the method of statutory interpretation
used in Heintz.15 3 Considering the goals and materials available
for review by the formalist approach to statutory interpretation, it
is the most restrictive when compared to the other methods.
154
Despite these restrictions, courts that stray from the approach do so
only under limited circumstances and with "caution." 155 The
Supreme Court has stated that there is "no more persuasive
evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. 156 Where
"these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation" it is not necessary to look any further
to determine its meaning. 157 However, when "that meaning has
his own experience and judgment when interpreting the statute. KELSO, supra
note 140, at 263. On the opposite end of the spectrum, instrumentalism allows
the judge the greatest leeway in determining the legislature's purpose. KELSO,
supra note 140, at 263. After reviewing all the materials, the instrumentalist
judge's conclusion may be "rather distant from the statute's actual words."
KELSO, supra note 140, at 263.
152 See Schrader v. Carney, 586 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (App. Div. 1992) (stating
that "[g]enerally, a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning
of its words"); Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curiale, 615 N.Y.S.2d 967,
970 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (stating that the "intent of the legislature should be
determined 'from the words and language used in the statute' ... if the language
[is] plain and clear").
153 Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297 (1995) (using the "plain language
of the Act itself' to determine the scope of removal of the attorney exemption).
154 See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text (discussing other
methods of statutory interpretation).
155 Schrader, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 690 (stating that courts should use caution
when they do not use the literal language of the statute as controlling the
interpretation of the statute to avoid misconstruing the purpose of the statute
through injection of the judges ideas).
156 United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
157 Id. See also Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., 760 F.2d 922,
924 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that legislative intent may be "ascertained from the
text of the statute if the words are clear and plain and the whole enactment
internally cohesive"); But see New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 343
N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1975) (stating that "[t]he words men use are never
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led to absurd or futile results ... [the Supreme Court] has looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the act."'' 58 Even when the
"plain meaning" does not lead to an absurd result but "merely an
unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole' [the Supreme Court] has followed that
purpose, rather than the literal words."' 159 Therefore, even though
the attorney exemption has been eliminated from the statute,
interpreting the statute in a manner that included all attorney
litigating activity as covered under the Act was surely contradictory
to the policy goals of the FDCPA.
The FDCPA was crafted as an "extraordinarily broad statute"
in an attempt to address a widespread problem of abusive debt
collection practices.160 As a result of its attempt to cover as many
situations as possible, the statute was left with little "plain
meaning" and an intent that was "anything but crystal clear."
' 161
Courts have been interpreting the poorly worded statute to cover
absolutely certain in meaning; the limitations of finite man and the even great
limitations of his language see to that . . . . [I]t is often said with more pious
solemnity than accuracy, the clarity of the statute precludes inquiry into the
antecedent legislative history.").
158 American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543.
159 Id. (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).
16 Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir. 1992). The Frey court
recognized the broadness of the statute but refused to tame it in the situation
facing it in dealing with the FDCPA's verification requirement for post-judgment
collection attempts. Id. The appellee argued that no exception existed for the
verification requirement to be read under sections 1692g(a) and 1692e( 11) of the
FDCPA for post-judgment demands of a debt. Id. The dissenting opinion stressed
that no FDCPA purpose was served by requiring a verification notice for post-
judgment collection attempts. Id. at 1522. Although the court agreed that such
an exception would be "sensible," the court held that it was constrained to follow
the statute as it was written. Id. at 1521. Therefore, in following the literal
language of the statute, the court clearly did not follow the purpose of the statute.
161 Bryan v. Clayton, 698 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). In
Bryan, the court rejected the conclusions reached by other federal circuit courts
that condominium maintenance fees were consumer debts within the definition
of the statute. Id. at 1238. However, the court continued to reject the "extension
of credit" doctrine introduced by Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d
1163 (3d Cir. 1987). Id.
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many more activities than originally intended. 162 A statute that
was "poorly drafted and whose true scope appears hopelessly lost
in its circular definitional scheme"'163 has been producing poor
decisions on some occasions.' 64 Given the confusing and ambigu-
ous nature of the FDCPA, the Court in Heintz should have looked
beyond the mere text of the statute to the legislative history and the
FTC Commentaries, to interpret its provisions. 65
Congress eliminated the attorney exemption in response to the
growing number of attorneys involved in debt collection practices
in order to have these attorneys fall within the scope of the
FDCPA. 166 The removal of the exemption immediately created
162 id.
163 Id.
164 Aside from Romea, deciding that rent is a debt, there are several cases
that have held that a consumer that tenders a check that is subsequently
dishonored creates a debt. See Snow v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., 143 F.3d 1350
(10th Cir. 1998); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 1998); Charles v.
Lundren & Assocs., 119 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky,
Bewster & Neider, 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997). These courts determined that
the dishonored check created a debt based upon the interpretation of the meaning
of "debt" under the FDCPA. Under the FDCPA, however, the meaning of "debt"
is necessarily modified by the definition of "creditor" under the statute. See 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (1994) (defining "creditor").
165 See Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that,
although the FTC's commentary on the FDCPA is not conclusive for the courts,
it should be accorded "due weight"). The court agreed with the interpretation of
the FTC, which stated that unpaid taxes are not a debt under the statute. Id. In
order to reach this conclusion, the court found that the personal property tax
incurred through ownership of a vehicle was not a "transaction" of the kind
contemplated by the FDCPA. Id. See also Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 279 (3d
Cir. 1980) (finding that the informal opinions issued by the FTC should be given
some weight by the court); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971,
976 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that the Federal Reserve Board staff opinions on
Regulation Z should be entitled great weight since they represent the opinions of
those with "informed experience and judgment"); Thomas v. Myers-Dickson
Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 1973) (suggesting that the Federal
Reserve Board's interpretation is the "more likely" meaning of the statute).
166 132 CONG. REc. H10031-02 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio). Rep. Annunzio estimated that 5000 attorneys were engaged in debt
collection. Id. At the time, the House Report estimated the number of lay debt
collection firms at 4500. H.R. REP. No. 99-405 (1985), reprinted in 1986
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some confusion as to the scope of attorney activities the Act
intended to regulate.167 However, even after the Court in Heintz
decided that all activities relating to debt collection are covered by
the FDCPA, the scope of the FDCPA was still unclear to practitio-
ners and courts.1 6
8
Despite removal of the attorney exemption from the FDCPA,
courts prior to Heintz pointed to the Act's legislative history to
suggest that the amendment to the Act was not intended to apply
to all attorney debt collection activities. 169 The Supreme Court
has suggested that the remarks of a sponsor of a bill that ultimately
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752. One plausible reason for removal of the attorney exemption
was the public's perceived abuses by attorneys involved in debt collection.
Strout, supra note 27, at 311. To support that proposition, Rep. Annunzio stated
that the repeal was "intended to place attorney collectors and lay collectors on
an equal footing," thereby removing any competitive advantage that attorneys
enjoyed in collecting debts. 132 CONG. REc. H10031-02 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Annunzio). Law firms, not subjected to regulation under the
FDCPA, were able to engage in activities that would otherwise be prohibited for
debt collection companies, such as calling debtors late at night or contacting
employers and neighbors regarding the debt. Id. These law firms occasionally
employed aggressive lay debt collectors to service their customers' accounts,
without the concern of running counter to the FDCPA. Id. However, since
regulation is associated with increased costs of entry into a market (i.e., costs of
compliance), an additional reason for elimination of the attorney exemption was
aimed at decreasing the number of law firms directly competing with commercial
debt collection agencies. Id.
167 Strout, supra note 27, at 310. There were two sides to the argument.
Strout, supra note 27, at 310. Consumer advocates argued that elimination of the
exemption indicated that the Act "should apply to attorneys engaged in litigation-
related activities." Strout, supra note 27, at 310. Creditor attorneys argued for a
"litigation exception." Strout, supra note 27, at 310.
168 Strout, supra note 27, at 321 (stating that the decision in Heintz "failed
to address a number of more troubling issues regarding the proper scope of the
Act as applied to litigators, such as whether a pleading is a communication under
the Act and whether the Act applies to all stages of the legal process").
'69 Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Keating, 753 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(stating that the purpose of the removal of the attorney exemption was not to
"sweep within the scope of the term 'debt collector' those attorneys acting in the
role of legal counsel while representing clients"); Heintz v. Jenkins, No. 93 Civ.
1332, 1993 WL 284115, at *3 (N.D. I11. July 27, 1993) (referring to the
comments of Rep. Annunzio); Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992)
(noting the FTC's policy interpretations of the FDCPA).
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is enacted serves as an "authoritative guide" to the statute.1 70 The
amendment to the FDCPA was identical to the amendment
introduced and commented upon by Representative Annunzio.171
Representative Annunzio described the amendment as a "fairness
bill" to make sure that all debt collectors "operate under the same
set of rules" and to remove any competitive advantage law firms
enjoyed over debt collection firms.7 2 However, any competitive
advantage the Representative sought to eliminate could only
address non-litigation activities since traditional debt collection
firms could not file a suit on behalf of their clients before or after
the amendment.
Congress intended the amendment to impact the estimated 5000
attorneys involved in debt collection.17 3 Representative Annunzio
170 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). Representative
Annunzio sponsored and drafted the amendment removing the attorney
exemption and made significant remarks about the legislation on the House floor.
H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1752.
171 H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1752.
Rep. Annunzio introduced the amendment as H.R. 4617 in 1984. Id. He
reintroduced the amendment as H.R. 237 on January 3, 1985. Id. The House
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee reported its findings on the
amendment to the House on November 26, 1985. Id. Rep. Annunzio made his
comments on the amendment on December 2, 1985, months before Congress
voted on the amendment. 131 CONG. REC. H10534-02 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1985).
The bill ultimately became law in July 9, 1986. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (1994).
172 131 CONG. REc. H10534-02 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio) (stating that the amendment is a "fairness bill [to] make certain that
all debt collectors operate under the same set of rules, a set of rules which debt
collectors themselves have testified are easy to follow and do not restrict the
business of ethical debt collectors") (emphasis added).
173 Id. At the same time, in 1985 there were approximately 653,686 lawyers
nationwide and 676,584 lawyers nationwide in 1986. American Bar Ass'n, Total
Number of Licensed Lawyers 1970 to Present (1998) (unpublished statistics on
file with the Journal of Law and Policy). It is not possible to determine how
many of these lawyers were engaged in landlord-tenant litigation, but approxi-
mately 2413 attorneys identified themselves as landlord-tenant attorneys in 1998,
in the 1998 edition of the Martindale-Hubbell Lawyer Directory. Telephone
Interview with Richard Lukowski, Marketing Rep., Chaminers Business and
Reprint Services (Jan. 27, 1999). This figure may not represent the total number
of attorneys practicing landlord-tenant law since only 60% of the 730,000
attorneys listed in the Martindale-Hubbell Directory list a specialty. Id. In
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stated that the amendment was necessary in reaction to the growing
number of law firms engaging in debt collection practices.' 74
These firms hired many non-attorneys to engage in the same
activities as account representatives in traditional debt collection
firms and often touted their ability to engage in activities directly
forbidden by the FDCPA.75 Therefore, in interpreting the amend-
ment, it is reasonable to conclude that the Representative intended
that these firms, which attracted so much public attention, be
subject to the FDCPA in their debt collection activities or face
liability. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the amend-
ment was not directed at the hundreds of thousands of lawyers not
engaged in debt collection.
176
After the amendment's passage in Congress, Representative
Annunzio addressed the confusion regarding its scope. 177 He
assured the legal community that "actions which can only be taken
by those possessing a license to practice law are outside the scope
of the act.' 78 The representative explicitly stated that the filing
of the complaint is not covered by the Act since these are not debt
collection activities but litigation activities.179 Furthermore, the
addition, not all attorneys pay to be listed in Martindale-Hubbell. Id.
174 132 CONG. REC. H10031-02 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio). Earlier, the Representative stated that "the fastest growing law firm
in the country does nothing but collect debts and is totally exempt from the Act."
131 CONG. REc. H10534-02 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio). Additionally, when the exemption existed, Congress "thought that
those [law firms] that did [engage in debt collection] would be operated in an
ethical manner or be subject to State bar discipline." Id. The Representative
concluded that this "has not been the case." Id.
175 131 CONG. REc. H10534-02 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio). One of the largest law firms in 1985 employed 700 lay persons along
with 121 attorneys. Id.
176 132 CONG. REc. H10031-02 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio) (stating that "[o]nly collection activities, not legal activities, are
covered by the act").
177 Id.
178 Id. (stating that "[a]ctions which can only be taken by those possessing
a license to practice law are outside the scope of the act [and that] filing of a
complaint is not covered by the act").
179 Id. (stating that since a complaint is not covered by the Act, "there is no
requirement that attorneys include the notices required [by the FDCPA] in legal
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Representative made a clear distinction between debt collection
activities and the practice of law by talking about debt collection
and litigation as two separate and distinct activities for attor-
neys. 180
The Federal Trade Commission's Commentary on the FDCPA
provides additional guidance on interpreting the FDCPA and
removal of the attorney exemption. 81 The Commentary defines
various terms used throughout the FDCPA.1 82 The definition of
a "communication" under the Act excludes the filing of a formal
legal action or the filing of a notice required by law as a "prerequi-
site to enforcing a contractual obligation between creditor and
debtor."1 83 In the Commentary's definition of "debt collector,"
the FTC associates law firms whose efforts to collect on debts
filings").
"' Id. (stating that "[t]he act applies to attorneys when they are collecting
debts, not when they are performing tasks of a legal nature").
181 Statements on General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097 (1988) [hereinafter "Staff
Commentary"]. The Staff Commentary, released December 13, 1988, is not
binding on the FTC or the public. Id. at 50101. The document is an attempt to
compile the informal staff letters the agency generated in response to the public's
requests for the agency's interpretation of various aspects of the FDCPA. Id. The
FTC is the governmental agency charged with enforcing the provisions of the
FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. §16921(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Since the FDCPA plays
such an enforcement role, some courts find that the Staff Commentary carries
some persuasive authority. See HOBBS, supra note 49, § 3.2.5.2, at 75. However,
the Staff Commentary is not binding where it conflicts with an unambiguous
provision of the FDCPA. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995).
Precisely what is an "unambiguous provision" of the FDCPA depends on the
court's statutory interpretation of the Act. See supra notes 148-151 and
accompanying text (discussing statutory interpretation). The Staff Commentary
has not been updated since its original publication and therefore has not been
altered to account for the Supreme Court's ruling in Heintz v. Jenkins.
182 Staff Commentary, supra note 181, at 50101-02. The defined terms
include: consumer; creditor; debt; and debt collector. Id.
183 Staff Commentary, supra note 181, at 50101. Legal filings excluded under
the Act, according to the Staff Commentary, include: the "filing of a lawsuit or
other petition/pleadings with a court; service of a complaint or other legal papers
in connection with a lawsuit; or activities directly related to such service." Staff
Commentary, supra note 181, at 50101.
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include activities associated with lay debt collection firms.184
However, the FTC excludes from the definition an attorney "whose
practice is limited to legal activities." '85 The Commentary refers
to the use of the courts to reduce debts to judgment as a legal
activity.186 Based on the FTC Commentary, it would appear that
the FTC intended to exclude attorneys who exclusively used the
courts to litigate debts and to exclude those activities undertaken
by attorney debt collection firms, which included the use of the
courts to reduce the debts to judgments.
In accordance with the legislative history of the Act, the
FDCPA should not apply to attorneys that use the courts to evict
tenants who have defaulted on their rent payments when the only
activities the attorney engaged in were those prescribed by the law
in securing the eviction. The literal approach followed by the Court
was not prudent since, by its legislative history, the extent of
activities the Act intended to cover was in question. Furthermore,
since the potential consequences to the legal profession were far
reaching, as most litigators would be subject to the FDCPA when
litigating on behalf of another, a more instrumentalist approach
would have been warranted because of the flexibility and resources
the Court could have considered in making its decision. 187 For
example, if a complaint is the first communication between a
debtor and a creditor's attorney, the pleadings are subjected to
"8 See Staff Commentary, supra note 181, at 50102 (including law firms
"whose efforts to collect consumer debts on behalf of its client regularly include
activities traditionally associated with debt collection, such as sending demand
letters or making collection telephone calls to the consumer"). The Staff
Commentary, however, takes a position contrary to this Note by stating that a
debt collector is also defined to include any firm that "regularly collects overdue
rent on behalf of real estate owners." Staff Commentary, supra note 181, at
50102.
185 Staff Commentary, supra note 181, at 50102 (excluding "[a]n attorney
whose practice is limited to legal activities (e.g., the filing and prosecution of
lawsuits to reduce debts to judgment)" from the Act). The Staff Commentary is
in apparent contradiction to Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), but the Staff
Commentary has not been updated since its original drafting.
186 Staff Commentary, supra note 181, at 50102.
187 See supra notes 148-151 (discussing approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion).
267
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
coverage of the FDCPA. This seems wholly unnecessary given the
internal regulation of court filings by the courts themselves and the
rules of ethics that govern lawyers. 8 8 Nevertheless, as a result of
the Court's decision, the lower federal and state courts have
followed suit and have continued to expand the protections
afforded consumers by the FDCPA. The protections of Heintz have
been expanded to the extent that they are used to subject attorneys
to the provisions of the FDCPA who litigate on behalf of landlords
to recover wrongfully detained property.'89 Apparently, the courts
have failed to "plausibly imply" to read the FDCPA to "authorize
the actual invocation of the remedy the collector 'intends to in-
voke'. ' "9 After all, when the attorney sends the section 711
notice to the tenant, does he not intend to evict him? This Note
answers the question in the affirmative.
2. Rent as a Debt Under the FDCPA?
After holding that attorneys seeking rent for landlords are debt
collectors under Heintz, the Second Circuit in Romea then decided
that rent is a debt under the FDCPA.' 9' At this time, the circuit
courts are split over which debts are covered by the FDCPA. 92
Specifically, the dispute is over whether the debt in question results
from an extension of credit or from a deferral of payments. The
Third Circuit, in deciding what obligations are covered under the
FDCPA, held that in order to be considered a debt under the
FDCPA, a transaction must involve the "offer or extension of credit
' See supra note 27 (discussing New York's Code of Professional
Responsibility).
189 Romea v. Heiberger, 165 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
" Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995).
'9' Romea, 163 F.3d at 116.
192 On one side of the split was the Third Circuit case, Zimmerman v. HBO
Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987), which required an extension or
offer of credit for an obligation to be covered under the FDCPA. The other side
of the split was manifested in the opinions of Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997), Newman v. Boehm, 119
F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997) and Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, 119 F.3d 922
(1 th Cir. 1997). These cases relied on the plain language of the FDCPA and did
not require any intentional offer or extension of credit to be made.
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to a consumer."' 93 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, did not
decide the issue in the same manner.'94 These courts found that
an extension of credit or deferral of payments is not the deciding
factor as to whether an obligation qualifies as a debt under the
FDCPA. Disagreeing with the Third Circuit's perspective, the
Romea court followed that of the Seventh and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. 195
For purposes of landlord-tenant litigation, a debt should require
a transaction in which a consumer was offered an extension of
credit. If a debt is defined under the FDCPA to require an
extension of credit, then it is unlikely that rent will be considered
a debt since tenants are not extended credit or given the opportuni-
ty to defer their rent payments. In practice, most tenants are
required to pay rent in advance of the period of their use of the
premises.196 In a typical lease, the landlord also collects a securi-
ty deposit from the tenant. 97 One of the primary purposes of the
security deposit is to be able to apply the deposit to the payment
of any overdue rent.'98 This clearly demonstrates an intention on
the part of the landlord not to extend credit to the tenant.' 99 For
193 Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168.
194 See Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322
(7th Cir. 1997); Newman v. Boehm, 118 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Brown v.
Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, 119 F.3d 922 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
195 Romea, 163 F.3d at 115 (rejecting the reasoning in Zimmerman, 834 F.2d
at 1168).
196 Romea v. Heiberger, 988 F. Supp. 715, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). For
example, rent for any month is usually due on the first of the month.
197 A typical security deposit lease clause reads as follows: "Tenant has
given security to Landlord in the amount stated above." Form A-55: Apartment
lease, comprehensive form, rules, guaranty, plain English format (Julius
Blumberg, Inc. 1984).
198 A typical security deposit lease clause reads as follows: "Tenant has
given security to Landlord in the amount stated above .... If Tenant does not
pay rent or added rent on time, Landlord may use the security to pay for rent and
added rent then due." Id.
199 It could be argued that the landlord may be making an extension of credit
if the landlord does not pursue the tenant for the overdue rent and the rent due
exceeds any security deposit the landlord has on hand. Otherwise, always
demanding the rent from the tenant when due should indicate an intent not to
extend credit.
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these reasons, the Second Circuit should have found that rent is not
a consumer debt under the FDCPA. As a result of its decision,
landlord-tenant litigation will be burdened with the additional
protections of the FDCPA.
In Zimmerman, the Third Circuit determined that "debts," as
defined by the FDCPA, were obligations of the same type dealt
with by the other chapters of Consumer Credit Protection Act
("CCPA").2°° Zimmerman confronted the issue whether the
defendant's attempt to collect on a settlement offer to avert a
lawsuit over theft of services was the type of transaction that gave
rise to a debt under the FDCPA. 20 ' The court observed that the
FDCPA was annexed to the CCPA and, therefore, found that the
scope of the FDCPA should be limited to the type of transactions
covered by the other sections of the CCPA.2 °2
The purpose of the CCPA is to encourage "informed use of
credit" by disclosing credit terms, thereby allowing the consumer
to compare the costs of credit from various providers.0 3 The
sections of the CCPA, which touch on various credit issues, include
defining finance charges, 2 ' determining annual percentage
rates, 205 and disclosing obligations under consumer personal
property leases and credit transactions.20 6 Other subchapters of
the CCPA demonstrate a pattern of concern by Congress in
providing consumers protection in credit transactions.2 7 In
200 Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1168 (3d Cir.
1987).
201 Id. at 1167.
202 Id. at 1168.
203 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693n (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
204 Id. § 1605(a) (defining finance charge as "the sum of all charges, payable
directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended, and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit").
201 Id. § 1606(a)(1)(A) (defining annual percentage rates as the "nominal
annual percentage rate which will yield a sum equal to the amount of the finance
charge when it is applied to the unpaid balances of the amount financed").
206 Id. § 1631 (listing several disclosure requirements for a creditor or lessor
of equipment).
207 See id. § 1671 (a)(1) (finding that "extensions of credit divert money into
excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the production and flow of goods
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Zimmerman, after considering the purpose of the FDCPA in light
of the CCPA, the court held that the FDCPA was not the appropri-
ate statute under which to seek protection from abusive practices
of plaintiffs attempting to collect on tort settlements.2 °8 The court
suggested that the plaintiff's remedy is "elsewhere than under the
FDCPA. '' 20 9 Likewise, protection for tenants in landlord-tenant
disputes should be found in the various state and local consumer
protection statutes, rather than the FDCPA.
Unlike courts following the logic of Zimmerman,21° which
look to other statutes for remedies for victims of abusive collection
practices, some courts suggest that the FDCPA be used to protect
consumers engaged in a broad range of transactions. 21 ' After
in interstate commerce"); § 1679 (finding that "certain advertising and business
practices of some companies engaged in the business of credit repair services
have worked a financial hardship upon consumers, particularly those of limited
economic means and who are inexperienced in credit matters); § 1681 (finding
that "[tihere is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their
grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's
right to privacy"); § 1691 (finding it unlawful for extension of credit to be based
on illegal discriminating criteria). These subchapters focus on various aspects of
consumer credit and banking. The remaining banking subchapter establishes a
framework for determining the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of the parties
in transactions involving the use of electronic systems to transfer funds. See id.
§1693. None of these subchapters refer to the relationship between a landlord
and tenant.
208 Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1168 (3d Cir.
1987).
209 Id. at 1169.
20 See, e.g., Coretti v. Lefkowitz, 965 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D. Conn. 1997)
(agreeing with Zimmerman's requirement of deferral of payment where defendant
attempted to collect premium cable fees from plaintiff who received cable
through unauthorized means); Sarver v. Capital Recovery Assoc., 951 F. Supp.
550, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a dishonored check is not a debt and that
there was no agreement of deferral of payment since a check is an immediate
form of payment and its dishonor does not create a debt); Adams v. Law Offices
of Stucker & Yates, 926 F. Supp. 521, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that
Zimmerman's definition of debt applies to an arrangement between a health-care
provider and a patient since there is a deferral, rather than an immediate payment
by patient).
211 See, e.g., Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d
1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the "absolute language" of the FDCPA
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acknowledging that not all obligations are considered debts under
the FDCPA,z12 these courts typically proceed to give the terms of
the statute its ordinary meaning.213 Under the plain meaning
interpretation of debt, few cases escape the province of the
FDCPA.
In giving the words of the Act their "ordinary meaning," the
Seventh Circuit in Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider,
S.C., concluded that an "offer or extension of credit is not required
for a payment obligation to constitute a 'debt' under the
FDCPA.'2 14 The Seventh Circuit took a fairly broad view of what
was considered a debt under the FDCPA by stating "[a]s long as
the transaction creates an obligation to pay, a debt is created.,
215
In Bass, the court concluded that a dishonored check created a debt
necessitating protection under the FDCPA when a plaintiff
attempted to collect on the dishonored funds.1 6
The majority opinion relied on Congress' elimination of the
limiting language of debt as including credit transactions.21 7 This
conclusion was based upon the elimination of the language from
the early drafts of the legislation and congressional hearings that
discussed collecting dishonored checks before the FDCPA became
law.218 The court noted that in drafting the FDCPA, early drafts
does not allow for a limited set of obligations to which the word "debt" may
apply).
212 Id. at 1324.
213 Id. at 1325.
214 Id. at 1326.
215 Id. at 1325. Another Seventh Circuit case, Newman v. Boehm, 118 F.3d
477 (7th Cir. 1997), was decided after and relied on Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997). The Newman court
noted that a number of courts deciding the debt issue followed the legal
reasoning promulgated in Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163,
1168-69 (3d Cir. 1987). Newman, 119 F.3d at 480.
216 Bass, 111 F.3d at 1330.
217 Id. at 1327. The earlier text of the bill defined "debt" as "any obligation
arising out of a transaction in which credit is offered or extended to an
individual, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household services." Id.
(quoting H.R. 13720, 94th Cong. (1976)).
218 Id. The materials relied on by the court were those of the Executive Vice-
President of the American Collectors Association, John W. Johnson, stating that
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restricted eligible debts to "any obligation[s] arising out of a
consumer transaction in which credit is offered or extended to an
individual., 219 The court inferred that the deletion of the credit
requirement demonstrated Congress' intention not to require an
extension of credit. 220 Therefore, the attempt by the defendant to
collect on the dishonored funds amounted to an attempt to collect
on a debt.
The dissent in Bass declined to agree with the majority's
interpretation of Congress' definition of debt under the
FDCPA.22' The dissent suggested that if Congress intended to
include dishonored checks as debts, it would have demonstrated its
intention by incorporating such a provision into the text of the
statute.2 In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent demand-
ed a consensual relationship between debtor and creditor before a
debt was created.223 Through a similarly broad statutory interpre-
tation and reliance on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bass, the
Eleventh Circuit in Brown, and the Second Circuit in Romea took
analogous positions on whether a debt requires an extension of
credit.224
passage of the FDCPA would make it difficult for financial institutions to collect
dishonored checks. Id. Discussion of the issue by this private citizen is not
dispositive, since this person could be mistaken as to the bill's applicability to
dishonored checks.
219 Id. (quoting H.R. 13720, 94th Cong. (1976)).
220 Id. at 1326.
221 Id. at 1331-32 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (stating that "the majority opinion
gives too little weight to the reasoning of Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate" and that
the FDCPA does "not cover bad checks given for goods and services").
222 Id. at 1331.
223 Id. at 1332. The nature of a check is to pay for goods or services
immediately and not to create a debtor-creditor relationship. Id. Implied by the
nature of checks and other negotiable instruments is that when presented to the
maker's financial institution, the instrument will be immediately paid. Id. Even
when a credit card is used to make a transaction, the credit relationship is solely
between the issuing bank and the credit card customer. Id. When a check or
credit card is accepted for payment, it is merely a convenience to the customer
not to require the physical transfer of legal tender at that moment and should not
create any credit relationship. Id.
224 Brown v. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 (1lth Cir.
1997) (following Bass, the court found that unpaid administrative and other fees
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The Second, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' refusal to consider
the context of the FDCPA within the CCPA was unjustified in light
of the legislative history and the reasoning of Zimmerman. Just as
these courts looked to the elimination of language from the statute
to reach their decisions, they should have looked to the language
of the caption of the FDCPA and the credit protection purposes of
the subchapters within the CCPA. It then would have become clear
that only transactions involving an extension of credit were
intended by Congress to be governed by the FDCPA.
C. The Policy Implications of Romea v. Heiberger on
Landlord-Tenant Relations
The Second Circuit's decision in Romea v. Heiberger will have
significant policy implications on landlord-tenant relations in New
York State. While tenants may have enjoyed a victory in terms of
consumer protection as a result of Romea, it is likely that many
landlords will continue to use attorneys for the entire eviction
process and will, therefore, pass on to tenants the increased costs
of rent collection under the requirements of the FDCPA. Further-
more, landlord-tenant relations will be stressed by an increased
measure of concern on the part of landlords towards tenants who
fail to pay their rents on time since the validation period mandated
by the FDCPA drastically increases the amount of time before
landlords can reclaim their property as opposed to the three day
waiting period under the RPAPL.
The increased consumer protection provided by Romea may
come at a high price as landlords seek to protect their investments
by passing along the potential increased eviction coStS. 225 Large
resulting from damage to a rental truck are debts under the FDCPA).
225 See Chicago Board of Realtors Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732,
741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring) (reflecting on the burdens and costs
to be imposed on tenants after the court's upholding of a Chicago ordinance that
granted tenants more legal rights). Judge Posner also states that landlords will
increase rents to offset the time value of money and less predictable cash flow.
Id. In addition, landlords will react to the granting of greater rights to tenants by
screening applicants more closely because the "cost of renting to a deadbeat will
now be higher." Id. Furthermore, the number of available units to rent to tenants
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and small landlords alike are unlikely to sit by idly and allow the
costs of business to increase without reacting. When landlords are
unable quickly to remove delinquent tenants from their property,
they are losing potential rental income.226 The eviction process
also becomes more expensive with the increased litigation over the
debt.27 These additional costs of business will be passed on to
the tenant in the form of increased rental costs.22 8 Landlords of
rent-control units or landlords that rent to low-income tenants will
be unable to pass the costs along by raising rents. The only
alternative will be to cut back on services. 22 9 Governmental
entities that manage public housing, may need to absorb the costs,
which may also lead to elimination of services. Ultimately,
landlords who are faced with the possibility of delinquent tenants
will increase the cost of rentals for the average consumer. Society
as a whole, and in particular poorer tenants, will bear the costs of
the FDCPA's increased consumer protection. Furthermore,
landlords may impose harsher eviction and screening policies in
reaction to this wave of consumer protectionism. 23'
Romea may also encourage landlords to bypass the use of
attorneys to act as their advocates. Such a result may be likely
because if landlords collect their own rent, they will not be forced
to comply with the burdensome restrictions of the FDCPA.232
This means that the landlord, himself must deliver the three day
notice and handle all aspects of the eviction until the parties enter
may decrease as landlords choose to convert rental apartments to condominia and
cooperatives in reaction to greater consumer protection given to tenants. Id. See
also Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or
Justice Served, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 385, 385-86 (1995) (discussing the
potential negative impacts on all tenants as the result of providing advocacy to
poor delinquent tenants in fighting evictions).
226 See Gunn, supra note 225, at 385.
227 See Gunn, supra note 225, at 385.
228 See Gunn, supra note 225, at 386.
229 See Gunn, supra note 225, at 386.
230 See Gunn, supra note 225, at 386.
231 Chicago Board of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th
Cir. 1987); Gunn, supra note 225, at 385-86.
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1994) (stating that a debt collector is one who
collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due another).
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court. This may be manageable for the small landlord with only a
few units, but nevertheless may lead to unnecessary complications
and pitfalls should the landlord improperly prepare or deliver the
notice or have a confrontation with the tenant.233
Of potential concern for landlords and landlords' attorneys alike
are the claims for wrongful eviction. 234 For the landlord that
ordinarily referred evictions to an attorney, the attorney will either
prepare the papers and return them to the landlord for signing, or
the landlord will commence the proceedings on his own. For the
attorney to complete the paperwork, send it to the landlord, and
subsequently, for the landlord to return the paperwork to the
attorney for service, several days could pass if conventional mail
is used. To do otherwise may amount to the significant expense of
overnight mail or the inconvenience of personal visits to the
attorney. To dispense with the careful review of paperwork may
expose the landlord or tenant to potential liability.235 If the
landlord is forced to prepare his own papers, there is the risk that
the notice may be inadequate or the service on the tenants may be
defective. These defects will result in additional litigation, costs
and delays as corrective measures are taken. The alternative is to
have the attorney handle all aspects of the litigation. Typically, the
most obvious way to avoid complications in the landlord-tenant
arena is to keep the process simple since landlord-tenant law is
not.236 The lengthy process described above is complicated and
having the landlord engage in the practice himself begs for trouble.
233 See Linda S. Votaw, Attorney Liability for Wrongful Eviction and Related
Landlord-Tenant Problems, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 7, 8 (1990) (stating that
educating the landlord of potential pitfalls of landlord-tenant actions should be
conducted to protect the landlord from potential repercussions).
234 Id. at 7-8 (reviewing common law wrongful eviction claims that may be
filed by tenants for tortious acts of the landlord or attorney and statutory
wrongful eviction claims that may be brought on broader grounds than common
law wrongful eviction).
235 Id. at 8.
236 Id. (stating the most obvious way to prevent claims in landlord-tenant
practice is "not to assume that landlord-tenant litigation is simple or uncomplicat-
ed").
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It is unwise to allow one to engage in the practice without "special
training" or knowledge of the "precautions" to be taken.237
Furthermore, for the landlord of several hundred or thousands
of units, it would be impractical for the landlord to sign each
individual notice prior to commencing summary judgment proceed-
ings. In the situation where the landlord is a corporation, only those
authorized to act on behalf of the corporation are allowed to sign
the notice. The dubious tenant may challenge the notice if it is
signed by anyone other than an officer of the corporation. Often,
the corporate landlords will turn to law firms to handle their
evictions from start to finish. As a result, the law firm litigating on
behalf of the landlord will become subject to the FDCPA.
Should the Supreme Court consider Romea on appeal, the Court
should determine that, since rent does not involve the extension of
credit or deferral of payments, rents are not debts under the
meaning of the FDCPA. In order to follow the Third Circuit
decision in Zimmerman, and its interpretation of a debt, the Court
will have to depart from the constraints of the "plain meaning"
approach as followed by the circuit courts that found rent to
constitute a debt.238 If the Court is willing to consider more than
the words of the statute, and follow an instrumentalist ap-
proach,239 the Court may fully appreciate the true intent of
Congress in creating the FDCPA and the policy implications on
rent collection practices that the Second Circuit ignored. The
district court in Romea expressed its concern that its ruling would
"require a sea of change in the practice as well as to open the door
to a flood of federal court suits against lawyers under the
FDCPA.' '240 If the Supreme Court heeds the recommendation of
the district court, then the analysis is complete: the FDCPA would
not apply once it is determined that rent is not a debt and,
237 Id. at 14.
238 See Romea v. Heiberger, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Brown v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 119 F.3d 922 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Newman v. Boehm,
119 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider,
S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997).
239 See supra notes 148-151 (providing a definition of the instrumentalist
approach to statutory interpretation).
240 Romea v. Heiberger, 988 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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therefore, landlord-tenant relations would necessarily be exempt
from the FDCPA.
III. NEW YORK'S CONSUMER PROTECTION RULES FOR TENANTS
SUPERSEDE THOSE OF THE FDCPA
Even if the FDCPA is applicable to real estate litigation in New
York under the premise that rent is a debt and attorneys are debt
collectors, tenants in New York benefit from superior protections
under state and local laws. Since the FDCPA, by its provisions,
only preempts state laws that are inconsistent with the protections
afforded by the FDCPA, the Romea court should not have
invalidated New York's rent collection and eviction proceeding
laws.241 Chapter 20 of New York State's GBL contains a "Con-
sumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices" provision that
seeks to protect consumers from deceptive acts or practices.242
This statute effectively accomplishes the same substantive goals as
the FDCPA and the FDCPA's purpose to "eliminate abusive debt
collection practices" in landlord-tenant cases.243 In addition, New
York City's Unfair Trade Practices Law provides roughly the same
protections for City tenants.2' Both statutes provide for an award
of actual245 and pecuniary damages.246 Through New York's
241 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (1994). See also supra notes 62-68 (discussing the
FDCPA's preemption of state laws).
242 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349 to 350-f (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999)
(offering New York State consumers protection against the "[d]eceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing
of any service").
243 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1994) (stating that it is the FDCPA's purpose to
"eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors").
244 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK §§ 20-700 to 20-706
(Lenz & Riecker 1999) (providing protection to New York City consumers from
"deceptive or unconscionable trade practice in the sale, lease, rental or loan or
in the offering for sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services,
or in the collection of consumer debts").
245 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(1) (1994).
246 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (giving the court the discretion to
"increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the
actual damages up to one thousand dollars"); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (1994)
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calculation of pecuniary damages as a multiple of actual damages,
it may be easier for a plaintiff to reach the maximum allowable
recovery.247 Furthermore, both allow the successful plaintiff to
recover attorney's fees.248 The GBL has the added benefit of
local enforcement by the Attorney General and the Attorney
General's ability to seek injunctive relief on behalf of consum-
ers.249 The FDCPA relies on administration by the FTC 25° and
knowledge on the part of consumers of their rights. It is far more
likely that the Attorney General in New York will take notice of
abusive eviction practices by attorneys within its state than the
FTC. Clearly, the GBL provides consumers with at least the same
amount of substantive protections as the FDCPA, although unlike
the FDCPA, it does not unnecessarily spell out the particular
procedural protections.
Tenants in apartments in New York State and New York City
enjoy strong protections from the unfair acts of landlords through
the State's GBL25' and the City Code. 2  Both statutes protect
against the deceptive practices of any business furnishing services
to consumers in the State253 and the City254 respectively. Since
(allowing additional damages not to exceed $1000).
247 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h).
248 Id. § 349(h); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (1994).
249 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988).
250 15 U.S.C. § 16921(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating that "compliance
with [the FDCPA] shall be enforced by the Commission, except to the extent that
enforcement of the requirements imposed under this subchapter is specifically
committed to another agency"). Some enforcement powers have been delegated
to other agencies where the offending party is a national bank or bank insured
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Id. § 16921(b). The FTC, and the FTC
alone, is the only federal agency with enforcement powers over the FDCPA with
regard to landlord-tenant activities. Id. § 16921(a).
251 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349 to 350-f (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999).
252 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § § 20-700 to 20-706
(Lenz & Riecker 1999).
253 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988). New York State
consumer protection law protects against "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service."
Id.
254 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 20-700. The City's
version of consumer protection law seeks to prevent any "deceptive or
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tenants who lease an apartment are viewed as "consumer[s] of
housing services" 25 5 they are entitled to the consumer protection
provisions of the GBL256 and the City Code. 57 Under the scope
of the two statutes, tenants are protected during the negotiating
process, tenancy, and subsequent eviction or collection attempts of
landlords.2 8 New York City's tenants benefit under the protection
of both the GBL and the City Code. The GBL 25 9 and City
unconscionable trade practice in the sale, lease, rental or loan or in the offering
for sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the
collection of consumer debts." Id.
255 23 Realty Assocs. v. Teigman, 624 N.Y.S.2d 155, 157 (App. Div. 1995)
(finding a residential lease the functional equivalent of the "purchase of services
from a landlord").
256 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a). The GBL applies to "[d]eceptive acts or
practices ... in the furnishing of any service." Id.
257 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 20-700. A
consumer under the City Code is a "lessee ... of ... consumer goods or
services." Id. § 20-701(d). Consumer goods under the City Code are "goods [or]
services . . . primarily for personal, household or family purposes." Id. § 20-
701(c).
258 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a). Under the City Code, "[d]eceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the
furnishing of any service" are prohibited. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK § 20-700. All business practices in connection with leasing
housing to tenants (from negotiating the lease to eviction) are a part of the
"furnishing" of the service to the tenant.
259 New York State's GBL section 349(h) states:
In addition to the right of action granted to the attorney general
pursuant to this section, any person who has been injured by reason of
any violation of this section may bring an action in his own name to
enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover his actual
damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions.
The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an
amount not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one
thousand dollars, if the court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly
violated this section. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees
to a prevailing plaintiff.
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988). Additionally, under section
350-d:
Any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee
thereof who engages in any of the acts or practices stated in this article
to be unlawful shall be liable to a civil penalty of not more than five
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Code260 provide for civil damages in the event of a statutory
violation. Under the GBL, the Attorney General may seek an
injunction and obtain restitution of the money obtained through the
use of unlawful acts or practices. 26' For each violation, a civil
penalty of five hundred dollars will be imposed in favor of the
consumer.262 Additionally, since 1980,263 the GBL has allowed
any person injured under its provisions to recover actual damag-
26426es or minimum statutory damages.265 If the court finds that
hundred dollars for each violation, which shall accrue to the state of
New York and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the
attorney general. In any such action it shall be a complete defense that
the advertisement is subject to and complies with the rules and
regulations of, and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade
Commission or any official department, division, commission or
agency of the state of New York.
Id.
260 See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 20-703 (Lenz
& Riecker 1999) (giving a private right of action for any violation of section 20-
700 of the City Code).
261 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988). Under the GBL,
"whenever the attorney general shall believe from evidence satisfactory to him
that any person, firm, corporation ... has engaged in or is about to engage in
any acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an action . . . to enjoin
such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution." Id.
262 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-d (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999).
263 See Joseph Thomas Moldovan, New York Creates a Private Right of
Action to Combat Consumer Fraud." Caveat Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 509,
509 (1982) (discussing the 1980 amendment to New York's GBL providing a
private right of action as a part of the State's attempt to curb deceptive and
unfair business practices).
264 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (stating that "any person who has been
injured by reason of any violation of this section may bring an action in his own
name ... to recover his actual damages"). See 99 Realty Co. v. Wall Street
Transcript Corp., 611 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768 (Civ. Ct. 1994) (finding a tenant
entitled to the amount landlord overcharged tenant for electricity as actual
damages).
265 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (stating that "any person who has been
injured by reason of any violation [of GBL § 349] may bring an action in his
own name ... to recover ... fifty dollars"). The plaintiff is entitled to collect
the statutory minimum $50 in damages regardless of proof of actual damages.
See Geismar v. Abraham & Strauss, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (Suffolk Dist. Ct.
1981) (stating "it seems that the Legislature intended fifty dollars to be easily
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a business "willfully or knowingly" violated the statute, then the
injured party may collect up to three times the actual damages,
with a limit imposed at a thousand dollars.266 Clearly, under the
GBL, a tenant can avoid the expense of litigating unfair practices
by the landlord or landlord's attorney and still enjoy all of the
benefits, including injunctive relief267 and damages.268 This
comfort results because the Attorney general can choose to enforce
the GBL independently, 269 or the costs of mounting a successful
action can be shifted to the defendant.27°
The City Code provides for a three-tier approach for recovery
of damages depending on the intent of the violation.271 For a
consumer to file a cause of action under the statute, it is not
necessary to prove any actual injury.272 The statute provides for
a strict liability imposition of penalties from fifty dollars to three
hundred and fifty dollars for any violation. 73 Upon a landlord's
knowing violation of the statute, a consumer may recover up to
five hundred dollars.274 Upon a showing of "repeated, multiple,
or persistent violation[s]" of the statute, the violator may be com-
pelled to pay into the court "all monies, property or other things,
or proceeds thereof, received as a result of such violations. 275
All damages recovered are collected into one account and distribut-
ed on a pro rata share to all affected parties.276 Although the City
recoverable"). The private remedy provision of the GBL was enacted to
encourage enforcement by individuals and deter deceptive conduct. See 99 Realty
Co., 611 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
266 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h).
267 Id. § 349(b).
268 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-d (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999)
(providing regulations when an action is brought by the attorney general);
§ 349(h) (providing regulations when the action is brought by a private party).
269 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney 1988).
270 Id. § 349(h).
271 See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK § 20-703(a)-(c)
(Lenz & Riecker 1999) (imposing different penalties for violations of the City
Code depending on the level of intent and frequency of the unfair trade practice).
272 Id. § 20-703(e).
273 Id. § 20-703(a).
274 Id. § 20-703(b).
275 Id. § 20-703(c).
276 Id.
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Code does not provide for injunctive relief,277 it does allow for
a reward of generous damages for both injured and uninjured
parties through a type of distribution scheme.278
Since both the GBL and the City Code protect tenants from
abusive rent collection practices as thoroughly as does the FDCPA,
the decision in Romea to invalidate New York's rent collection
proceedings should be overturned. However, even if Romea is not
overturned, the FDCPA provides for a mechanism by which a state
can petition the FTC to have certain statutes exempt from the
requirements of the Act.279 This provision may be a state's last
hope of maintaining its current landlord-tenant system in light of
the Romea decision which effectively dismantled the summary
proceeding process. 280 However, in order for the FTC to grant
New York the exemption for landlord-tenant practice, New York
must first show that it has laws that are "substantially similar" to
the FDCPA and that these laws are adequately enforced.28'
277 See Id. § 20-703 (providing for only monetary penalties for violations of
the City Code).
278 See generally Van Cortlandt Park Dodge v. Commissioner of Dept. of
Consumer Affairs, 577 N.Y.S.2d 274, 274-75 (App. Div. 1991) (listing penalties
received on behalf of consumers for deceptive advertising by car dealership);
Beth Kobliner, Tax Giant's Loan Deals Stir Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998,
§ 3, at 5 (explaining a settlement by H & R Block with the New York City
Department of Public Affairs in the amount of $250,000 in fines and costs and
a mandate to install a phone system to explain procedures to consumers).
279 15 U.S.C. § 1692o (1994). Section 1692o states that:
The Commission shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of
this title any class of debt collection practices within any State if the
Commission determines that under the law of that State that class of
debt collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar
to those imposed by this title, and that there is adequate provision for
enforcement.
Id.
280 Romea v. Heiberger, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
281 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Congress' concern for the unsavory acts of attorneys involved
with debt collection may be justified. However, there are already
safeguards in place in New York to protect tenants during the
summary proceeding process. The nature of summary proceedings
provides for an expeditious resolution of the rent collection dispute
on its merits. New York State's consumer protection laws protect
tenants from the deceptive acts and practices of landlords and their
attorneys. The consumer protection laws allow for both private
causes of action and enforcement by the Attorney General. The
FTC's examination of these various rules and procedures would
demonstrate that there is little need for additional protection for the
tenant-debtor before or after litigation has begun. Therefore, upon
review, the Commission should grant New York an exemption
from the FDCPA's requirement for landlord-tenant litigation.
The recent Second Circuit decision in Romea disrupted the
smooth functioning of New York's statutory scheme for securing
evictions. A process that once was rapid will now be bogged down
with cumbersome validation procedures and lawsuits against
landlords' attorneys. This result demonstrates the need for reinter-
pretation of the statute by the Supreme Court or for a modification
of the FDCPA by Congress. The Romea court's analysis of the
FDCPA was unduly restricted by its plain meaning approach. The
legislative history of the FDCPA clearly supported an alternative
result that would have left New York's summary proceeding
process intact. Furthermore, the Romea court failed to consider the
true implications of its decision.
Without needed modifications, the preemption of New York's
summary proceedings by the FDCPA will result in higher costs of
real estate practice. The impact of increased costs also will be felt
far outside the rental industry, as consumers will have less money
to spend on other items or services. Additionally, the increased
litigation will further burden the judicial system as tenants seek to
prolong the amount of time they can remain on the landlord's
premises until eviction.
There is little overall benefit in maintaining the new FDCPA-
RPAPL system for either honest tenants or landlords. New York
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has created a workable system for managing the large caseload of
landlord-tenant disputes. It is a system that adequately protects the
interests of tenants and landlords and should be left to function
without the influence of the FDCPA.

